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ABSTRACT
In 2017, a genocide in Myanmar took place against the stateless minority Rohingya
Muslims. Why couldn’t the UN protect the Rohingya’s human rights? The international
community's efforts to oppose these violations against the stateless people have been only
passive. Then, who upholds your human rights when you are stateless? Using chronology,
historical institutionalism, and process tracing analyses, this thesis (1) evaluates the UN’s legal
regime’s systemic design and capabilities in protecting human rights; then (2) identifies the
design flaws of our international human rights regime; and lastly, (3) develops a recommendation
to protect all people, stateless or not. Based on both quantitative and qualitative data on
established human rights institutions, documents, mechanisms and efforts, and the UN’s
handling of Rohingya Genocide as a case study, this thesis argues that I will argue that the UN
was unable to protect the Rohingya’s human rights because there is a set of flaws within its
institutional systemic design, which limits its ability to intervene and address humanitarian
crises. It identifies the four critical systemic design flaws w
 hich explain why the UN’s ability to
protect all people is limited and inconsistent. Previously, scholars have suggested creating
comprehensive refugee/stateless laws and making the Universal Declaration of Human Right,
and 1954 and 1961 the Statelessness Conventions legally binding as a solution.1 This thesis
recommends an alternate solution: Project Global Citizenship. As a formerly undocumented
immigrant, I continue to find this topic compelling for people of our generation to care and find
justice for vulnerable people our governments have neglected.

Kaveri, “Being Stateless and the Plight of Rohingyas,” Peace Review 29, no. 1 (February 2017): pp. 31-39,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1272295.
1
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
The international legal definition of a stateless person: “A person who is not
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law” .2
— Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954)
Three years ago, in 2017, the world was shaken with news that another tragic genocide
was taking place against the “stateless” minority, the Rohingya Muslim people, in Myanmar.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, pursuant to the 1954
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the legal definition for stateless persons is
people who are “individuals who are not considered citizens or nationals under the operation of
the laws of any country” (UNHCR, 1954). Furthermore, according to UNHCR, there are millions
of people around the world who are “stateless” today (UNHCR). In comparison to the Rohingya
Crisis, there is a horrific historical precedent which may be familiar to many, the genocide of
European Jews in the Nazi Holocaust between 1941 and 1945. In the aftermath of the Second
World War, the United Nations was formed in 1945, motivated by 51 countries committing to
maintain international peace and security, and to prevent future human rights atrocities like the
Nazi genocide and Japanese war crimes. All these decades later and everything the world has
been through, why are stateless people and the Rohingyas still left without protection? The
protection of Rohingya People’s human rights would presumably fall under the UN’s
jurisdiction, as the UN’s founding Charter mentions and promotes the protection of human rights
seven times, and lastly, its preamble in their Charter set one of their objectives as to uphold the
international laws and treaties (UN). Where was the UN when the vulnerable Rohingya
Muslims’ human rights were being violated? Some scholars like Kate Cronin-Furman, a human
rights professor at University College London, and institutions, such as the United States

UN, “Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,” opened for signature June 6, 1960, Treaty Series 360,
no. 5158 (1954):136, treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20360/v360.pdf
2

Lee 10

Holocaust Memorial Museum, even contend that the world knew that the Genocide was going to
happen ahead of time, as early as 2015.3 Whether the world knew early as of 2015 or not, this
presents an interesting two-part puzzle: Why could not the UN protect the Rohingya’s human
rights? (“First Part”) Secondly, if the UN could not, then who upholds your human rights when
you are stateless? (“Second Part”)
In this thesis, I will argue that the UN was unable to protect the Rohingya’s human rights
because there is a set of flaws within its institutional systemic design, which limits its ability to
intervene and address humanitarian crises.
This inability to intervene and protect the Rohingya’s human rights was caused by path
dependent effects,4 meaning that over time the design flaws were never fixed, and improvement
or change was not possible. I examined the Rohingya case chronologically to identify "critical
junctures," when change might have been possible. I identified two such critical junctures: 1962,
when the military took over and enforced exclusionary ideology and there was no UN pushback;
and then 2015, when it looked like an election could weaken the military's hold and allow the
UN to have more influence/protect the Rohingya. But in reality they were able to continue
enforcing their ideology against the Rohingya, without UN pushback.
In particular, the second part can be broken down to two separate questions: an objective
and empirical question of which international, regional, and domestic actors or authorities are
capable of protecting human rights; and a normative question of who should protect your human
rights. I will argue that within the international human rights regime, states, and IGOs, are the
main actors capable of upholding your human rights when you are stateless, in Chapters 2 and 3.5
Kate Cronin-Furman, “The World Knew Ahead of Time the Rohingya Were Facing Genocide,” Foreign Policy,
September 19, 2017,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/19/the-world-knew-ahead-of-time-the-rohingya-were-facing-genocide/.
4
I would like to thank Professor Stephanie Golob, my thesis advisor, and Professor Marcus Johnson, one of my
departmental readers, for bringing this to my attention.
5
For the purpose of this study, the scope of this study will only consider the states, and IGOs.
3
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However, in Chapter 5, I will also argue that while these actors, and this regime, may be capable,
no one will uphold your human rights when you are stateless, or at least not consistently.
I.

Brief History of Human Rights
Today, the most widely accepted definition of human rights is “rights inherent to all

human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other
status,” according to the United Nations.6 Although this concept and definition is relatively a
new international norm which was constructed and developed to protect all people in the last 75
years, its fundamental root and foundation goes back much further in history. Researchers at the
University of Minnesota's Human Rights Resource Center, claim that in history, rights and
responsibilities were first acquired through their membership in a group – such as a family,
indigenous nation, religion, class, community, or state.”7 Then, societies began establishing the
social value of rights and wrongs and rules such as "treat others like how you want to be treated"
or an “eye for an eye,” in their traditions, according to German-American philosopher Walter
Kaufmann.8 Over time, all societies had some level of ideas and principles of propriety and
justice in their system, whether orally or in writing.9 In fact, some of the oldest writings that
possess and address the ideas of people’s duties, rights, and responsibilities in record are the
Bible, the Quran, the Hindu Vedas, the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi and the Analects of
Confucius.10 Other notable human rights documents in history are the Magna Carta of 1215, the

6

UN, “Human Rights,” United Nations (United Nations), accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/.
7
Nancy Flowers, ed, Human Rights Here and Now:Celebrating the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Part I: A Short History of Human Rights. Human Rights Educators' Network of Amnesty
International USA, the Human Rights Resource Center, and the Stanley Foundation, 1998, accessed and verified on
November 29, 2020, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-history.htm.
8
Walter Kaufmann, "The Origin of Justice," The Review of Metaphysics 23, no. 2 (1969): 209-39, accessed and
verified on November 29, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20125533.
9
ibid.
10
Nancy Flowers, ed, op. cit.
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English Bill of Rights of 1689, the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789,
and the US Constitution and Bill of Rights of 1791.
Many of the modern concepts of human rights and even writers of some of the famous
human rights documents such as the US Declaration of Independence, and Bill of Rights of
1791, are believed to have derived ideas from the English philosopher John Locke’s Second
Treatise of Government, where Locke advocated for natural rights, in 1689.11 Locke theorized
that all individuals are born with certain "inalienable" natural rights — God-given rights, which
can never be taken or even given away. Rights to “life, liberty, and property,” popularly
associated with political theory of Liberalism, are Locke’s ideas. Following Locke’s ideas and
the American Revolution, many countries have incorporated them into their political systems and
scholars, also known as natural rights theorists, theorized about the concept of natural rights.
To date, basing human nature as the source of the rights— according to Jack Donnelly in
his essay

“Human Rights as Natural Rights” in Human Rights Quarterly —
 natural rights

theorists have established three different types with minor subtle differences: natural rights, the
rights of man, a nd human rights. 12
 They all differ based on where they claim the source of our
rights are from, respectively. For example, natural rights stress a grounding in human nature.
Meanwhile, the rights of man suggest man as the source of rights. It is to the extent that man is
viewed as not merely natural, but rational and moral. This suggests a more complicated, and
probably more illuminating, source for these rights. As for human rights, similar to both natural
rights and the rights of man, it suggests a derivation of rights from the complex moral notion of
humanity.

11

Constitutional Rights Foundation, “Natural Rights,” 2001, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/natural-rights.html.
12
Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights as Natural Rights,” Human Rights Quarterly 4, no. 3 (1982): pp. 391-405,
https://doi.org/10.2307/762225, 391.
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Moreover, natural rights in general can also be distinguished into negative and positive
rights. A distinction between negative and positive rights is that the negative right is entitlement
to non-interference, while positive right is entitlement to provision of some good or service. To
better understand the concept, some of the examples of negative rights are civil and political
rights such as freedom of speech, life, private property, freedom of religion, and a fair trial.
Some of the examples of positive rights are police protection of person and property, the right to
counsel, as well as rights to food, housing, public education, employment, and a minimum
standard of living. Traditionally, natural rights were viewed as exclusively negative rights,
whereas human rights also comprise positive rights.
II.

International Human Rights Regime
Contrary to the common assumption, the UN is neither a synonym of global governance

nor a sole machine or a system which the world runs by. In fact, the UN is only just part of what
an international regime is.
So, what is an international regime? Post-World War II, with the increase in
interdependence and cooperation among states, there were dilemmas in the coordination and
organization of international relations, law, order, authority, and organizations. Historically,
many scholars used different theories such as realism, liberalism and constructivism to describe,
explain, and predict various aspects of international relations and to define what an international
regime is. The most widely accepted definition of an international regime is by international
relations theorist Stephen D. Krasner. In his 1982 journal article “Structural causes and regime
consequences: regimes as intervening variables,” he defines an international regime as “implicit
or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” In other words, the international
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regime is an international process and collection of rules. According to Robert O. Keohane’s
1982 journal article “The Demand for International Regimes,” the major function of international
regimes is to “facilitate the making of specific agreements on matters of substantive significance
within the issue-area covered by the regime.” This main function of international regimes can be
found in different forms and types such as international conventions, treaties, and international
organizations, including both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. As
Krasner and Keohane described, international regimes consist of many actors, such as states,
IGOs, NGOs, etc. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I am going to focus on one category
of actors: international governmental organizations, or IGOs, whose members are states.13
III.

Research Procedure
There are many studies and literatures on human rights, the stateless, and even on the

Rohingya Muslim Crisis, which focused primarily on the actions of states that violate human
rights14 and/or have taken snapshots on institutions at the time.15 Unlike these previous studies,
this thesis offers a long term view over how human rights institutions developed over time.
Again, the main puzzles that this thesis focuses on are: Why couldn't the UN protect the
Rohingya’s human rights?; and Who upholds your human rights when you are stateless?. My
answer comes in three parts: first, describing the international human rights regime and
identifying the main actors that are capable of protecting human rights — States, and IGOs
(including the UN)— and their roles, and second, identifying the design flaws of our

 I would like to thank Professor Thomas Halper, one of my departmental readers, for bringing this to my attention.
For example, see Nicolas Rost, “Human Rights Violations, Weak States, and Civil War,” Human Rights Review
12, no. 4 (January 2011): pp. 417-440, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-011-0196-9.
15
For instance, see Volker Heins, Aditya Badami, and Andrei S. Markovits, “The West Divided? A Snapshot of
Human Rights and Transatlantic Relations at the United Nations,” Human Rights Review 11, no. 1 (2009): pp. 1-16,
accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-009-0133-3.
13
14
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international human rights regime. Finally, I demonstrate the causal connection16 between the
design flaws and the Rohingya Muslim Human Rights Crisis.
In the next section of this chapter, I will develop three interrelated concepts that I will use
to construct my answers to these puzzles: historical institutionalism, path dependency, and
process tracing, and systemic design flaws; and lastly make the connection to Rohingya Muslim
human rights crisis.
Historical Institutionalism & Path Dependency
To understand why the UN’s human rights regime looks the way it does today, I first
began the research by mapping out the development of the international human rights regime.
Next, I traced what human rights institutions came about at what time and how they changed
over time, from 1945 to present (2020). I identified the following critical junctures where there
was either a major systemic changes or institutional growth within the UN’s human rights
regime: the end of WWII and the creation of the United Nations (1945); start of Cold War (1947)
with Truman Doctrine; rise of the American Unipolarity (1989) and end of Cold War with
collapse of Soviet Union (1991); and the end of the American Unipolarity, and the rise of
Multipolar world (2009-). From each of these critical junctures, I looked at the context behind
“why” some of these Human Rights institutions or instruments were created, as well as why
some were closed off and not others. As a result of this historical institutionalism and chronology
analyses, one of the reasons why the UN is the way it is right now is because one of the key
actors in the international regime are states. Sovereignty gives states the authority not only over
their territory and people, but also over powers they delegate to international institutions.

I am using this term “causal connection” and recognize that in a single case study I cannot prove causality,
however, I do think that my case does point to future research in comparative case studies. I would like to thank
Professor Marcus Johnson, one of my departmental readers, for bringing this to my attention.
16
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Furthermore, they create international law and norms and have the freedom to either comply or
to not.
Process Tracing & Path Dependency
To understand how the crises and genocide took place in 2017 and the UN’s response, I
traced and constructed a detailed chronologies from Rohingya’s history to post-2017 genocide
and the UN’s effort, following the “process tracing” qualitative analysis method. Plotting events
chronologically with detailed summaries, allows us to see how a certain outcome came about as
a result of the convergence of several conditions, causal chains, and independent variables,
according to David Collier.17 Then, I observed which variables or conditions would cause and
lead to these effects.
As a result of the process tracing method, I identified two moments — 1962 and 2015 —
as critical junctures w
 hen the UN might have had the opportunity to save Rohingya from the
path of becoming stateless, experiencing decades of persecution and violence, and going through
the gruesome genocide in 2017, but ultimately was unable to take that new path due to political
regime changes. First in 1962, following the coup, after Burma’s form of government changed
from General Aung San’s democratic regime to General Ne Win’s military regime, the
international human rights regime had up to 1974 to either pressure the Junta to restore the
democratic system or even to sign onto many human rights conventions, especially on
statelessness. With no opposition both domestically and internationally, the junta’s rule
continued. Their continued rule eventually stripped the Rohingyas’ citizenship, making them
stateless by 1982, and successfully ostracized and supported various violent campaigns and
David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics, 44, Issue 4 (October 2011):
823-830, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
http://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/understanding-process-tracing/183
A057AD6A36783E678CB37440346D1.
17
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persecutions against the Rohingyas. Then, again, in 2015, when the National League for
Democracy party led by Nobel Peace prize laureate and the current Counsellor of Myanmar,
Aung San Suu Kyi, won, the international human rights regime had up to 2017, to either pressure
the Suu Kyi’s regime to restore Rohingya’s citizenship and to resolve the interethnic conflict
between Burmese majority and Rohingyas; or to utilize the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ to step in,
in light of previous crises in 1991, 2006, and/or 2016.
These two key moments became critical junctures, in which I looked at how they
contributed to “path dependency. ” According to scholar Paul A. David, path dependency
analysis, looks at critical junctures and reflects on how the decisions made during this time
limited the trajectory of the future.18 Studying these two defining moments offered this thesis the
spectrum of choices and decisions made by Myanmar, the UN, and other powerful actors that
helped explain why the UN's mechanism for protecting stateless people and their rights today is
the way it is in its current condition of ineffectiveness.
IV.

Four Design Flaws
In this section, I am going to discuss the existence of multiple systemic design flaws that

limit the UN’s ability to protect all people, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4 (“Design
Flaws”.
Jurisdiction. The first Design Flaw is ‘jurisdiction.’ Many States still retain a lot of power
over how they treat their citizens, and as a result, this limits the UN’s limited jurisdiction in
states’ affairs and delays the protection of human rights from taking place on time. Sometimes,
as we will note in the case of Rohingya genocide later in chapter 5, the state blatantly denies

Paul David, “Path Dependence, Its Critics, and the Quest for 'Historical Economics',” EconPapers, January 1,
1970, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://econpapers.repec.org/bookchap/elgeechap/12603_5f7.htm.
18

Lee 18

even the UN’s investigation from taking place. This goes to show how state sovereignty can be
used to undermine the international human rights regime’s authority. This will be later further
discussed in Chapter 4.
Hierarchy of World Power. T
 he s econd Design Flaw is the Hierarchy of World Power in
the UN. Although the UN is presented as an equal membership IGO, based on the United
Nations General Assembly’s “one state, one vote” policy, in practice, some states have either
greater or lesser power and influence within the system usually based on the world’s power
structure, measured by combined means of economic, military, technological and cultural
strength as well as diplomatic and soft power influence. This is especially apparent in the uneven
membership and power balance within the United Nation Security Council. The permanent
membership and veto power of the five permanent members (the P-5) in the Council give the P-5
superpowers an unfair influence over all the important decisions involving international security
and peace matters. This will be later further discussed in Chapter 4.
Competition. The third Design Flaw is competition. In the study of the UN's structure and
role in the international human rights regime, for their selective interest, States have either
attempted to join or joined specific UN bodies to gain a say and/or influence over world matters
and international norms, this was apparent in the case of certain human rights bodies and
especially the Council. In other cases, the UN’s human rights regime’s decision making and
moves in certain international human rights matters and/or concerns seemed to vary based on the
state's selective interest or political will. In the UN’s history of enforcement of bringing peace
and protection of human rights, there are cases where states’ selective interest, driven by either
competition or for its own needs, has either delayed or prevented an action by the UN. This will
be later further discussed in Chapter 4.
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Slow Adaptation to Change. The fourth Design Flaw is the UN’s slow adaptation to
change.19 In the history of the UN, whenever there are cases of breakdown and emergence of
new States; or when a state’s form of government changes; and/or when a state creates a new
inclusion or exclusion policy, it does not have any preventive measures against it or at least its
measures are slow and inefficient. This will be further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 with the
case study of Rohingya Muslim crisis and genocide.
V.

Structure of the Argument
This thesis is organized in the following order. First, in chapter 2, I explain why our

human rights vary state-by-state, present the role of a state, and about the stateless people. In the
following chapter, I provide background information about the intention behind the creation of
the UN, the anatomy of the UN, human rights institutions, UN’s Institutional Evolution, as well
as the evaluation of the un international legal regime’s ability to protect human rights. In Chapter
4, I discuss the four critical systemic design flaws in more details. Chapter 5 presents the case
study of Rohingya Muslim Crisis and the genocide, focusing on the UN’s role, and
demonstrating how the Design Flaws were at play following path dependency. Finally, the
concluding chapter presents this thesis’ findings and recommendation for overcoming the
obstacles to human rights protection for stateless people outlined above titled ‘Project Global
Citizenship.’

 I would like to thank Professor Marcus Johnson, one of my departmental readers, for the name suggestion for this
design flaw.
19
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CHAPTER 2 – NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, THE STATE, AND THE STATELESS
I.

Introduction

Human rights, as discussed in Chapter 1, are rights that are supposed to be based on people’s
humanity. In other words, they are rights we have simply because we exist as humans and they
are not granted by any state. Yet, in reality, why do our human rights vary state-by-state? It is
because the political entity that really controls our human rights are our national governments.
This concept of how each state’s exclusive sovereignty over its territory prevails over our human
rights will be explained with the principle of Westphalian sovereignty, in the context of
international law. In particular, the group of people that are most vulnerable to the fact that the
state controls how they treat their citizens are stateless people. In this chapter, I am going to first
delve into the principle of Westphalian Sovereignty. Then, I will discuss the state's role as a key
actor in human rights, and explore more about stateless people, by providing a general
background on who the stateless people are; how people find themselves stateless; and what it
means to be a De Jure versus a De facto s tateless person.
II.

The Principle of Westphalian Sovereignty
Pursuant to the principle of Westphalian sovereignty, or state sovereignty—each state has

an exclusive power or authority over its territory. This principle of self-determination and
non-interference can be historically traced to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, the end of the Thirty
Years War (1618- 1648), and then was further developed in the 18th century.
Henry Kissinger, former United States Secretary of State, notes that Westphalian
sovereignty is “a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other's
domestic affairs and checking each other's ambitions through a general equilibrium of power.”20
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Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2015), 3.
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Under this system, each state would acknowledge its fellow states’ domestic structures and
customs and rules by refraining from challenging their existence.
The principle of Westphalia is also protected and addressed in the United Nations
Charter, which states that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."21 In
other words, under the UN Charter, the UN will respect every state's right to sovereignty and
neither infringe them nor force the states to give them up.
Today, it is widely believed that the Westphalian system reached its peak in the 19th and
20th centuries, but has met challenges with the advancement of communication tools like the
internet, Facebook, and Twitter in the 21st century and facing recent challenges from advocates
of humanitarian intervention.22 Furthermore, the forces of liberalization and globalization have
also contributed to the erosion of Westphalian State Sovereignty and the gradual acceptance of
international accountability in how states treat their citizens.23
III.

States as a Key Actor and their Role (Internationally & Domestically)

Internationally
Today, there are about 195 UN recognized sovereign countries in the world. However,
their relative importance in the international human rights regime also varies. Powerful and large
states are more likely to play a bigger role than are smaller and less powerful states. The U.S.
role, also known as U.S. hegemony, is a good example of this. Historically, in particular, among
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UN, “Charter of the United Nations,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/.
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the states and scholars, the ideas and efforts behind the structure and rules of the post-WWII
international system, promotion of multilateralism, as well as, liberal ideas in the international
regime are often recognized and credited to the U.S.24 The U.S.’ dominant role in developing
and promoting these rules and structures is an example of how some states, especially
superpowers, utilize their role and change the international system’s rules, and/or norms with its
participation and influence.
In contrast, since large numbers of less developed, small, and weak states, generally do
not amount to much power and influence individually, unlike their counterpart superpowers, they
exhibit different collective behaviors. According to scholars such as Shepard Forman and Derk
Segaar, they collectively form coalitions to enlarge their voices and set global agenda and link
issues of importance to them.25 In the last couple of decades, with varying degrees of success, the
small states have endeavored together to shape the agendas, priorities, and the IGO’s programs.
Transitioning to today, we are living in a multipolar world, where no one state holds the
same power and/or the legitimacy to shape nor change the international regime like the U.S. once
held during U.S. hegemony. Instead, we have a system with multiple emerging key state actors,
other than the U.S., such as BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and from 2010
South Africa, with relative power in the international regimes. Andrew Hurrell contends that the
increase in the number of key states since 1990, are the sources of current disorder of
international stability and regime’s inability to perform basic functions.26
Donald J Puchala, "World Hegemony and the United Nations," International Studies Review 7, no. 4 (2005):
571-84, accessed and verified on November 13, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3699675.
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Shepard Forman, and Derk Segaar, "New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of
Multilateralism." Global Governance 12, no. 2 (2006): 205-25, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27800610.
26
Andrew Hurrell, "Rising powers and the emerging global order," In The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations, 8th ed, edited by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019, Politics Trove, 2019, accessed and verified on November 13, 2020. doi:
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Domestically
At the national level, as Westphalian tradition postulates, s tates are responsible for how
they treat their people. Not every state fulfills their commitment to their international human
rights obligations. Every state is different. Just as there are some states who play the role of a
protector of human rights, there are states who play the role of abusers of human rights as well.
However, they can be usually distinguished simply by their regime type. For instance, in general,
the authoritarian, autocratic, or socialist states are more likely to abuse political and civil rights.
Meanwhile their counterpart liberal states are more likely to protect them. The human rights
protector states generally take their commitment to their human rights obligations by
internalizing and protecting human rights in their policies, laws, and institutions or by supporting
similar human rights provisions elsewhere.27
In contrast, human rights violator states usually use their policies, laws, and institutions to
discriminate or to strip or to violate or to exclude individual human rights. More often than not,
this also includes employing of violence and/or physical force, which are often justified with the
excuse of state security or perceived threat. In other cases, state responsibility for human rights
abuses also occurs when there is a lack of resources. For instance, less developed states or even
liberal democratic states sometimes either overlook or are unable to meet its basic obligations of
social and/or economic rights or collective rights, simply due to lack of resources.
IV.

Stateless People

Defining Stateless
It was the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons which
internationally and officially acknowledged and defined what stateless means. In Article 1 of the
Zehra F. Arat, "Human Rights and Democracy: Expanding or Contracting?" Polity 32, no. 1 (1999): 119-44,
accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, doi:10.2307/3235336, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3235336?seq=1
27
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1954 Convention, the UN defined that a “person [who is] not considered a national (or citizen)
automatically under the laws of any State, is stateless.”28 In simpler terms, a stateless person does
not have a nationality of any country. Shortly after, in 1961, the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness was passed to establish international norms relating to nationality and to reduce
statelessness over time. In effect, it established safeguards for the nationality laws concerning
citizenship by birth and later in life, to give newborns with no nationality access to citizenship
and to prevent states from stripping people’s nationality, turning them “stateless.”29
Stateless people are considered and treated differently than other groups like refugees or
asylum seekers, internationally. To be fair, unlike an asylum-seeker or a refugee, stateless people
are usually ostracized and have limited to no access to school, a doctor, jobs, open a bank
account, buy a house or even travel easily because they lack both crucial identity and travel
documents. Meanwhile, a refugee or an asylum seeker might have an identity or travel
documents, which is mandatory to seek refuge in most, if not all, states.
How do people find themselves stateless?
People find themselves stateless in many cases and with many causes as well. According
to UNHCR, some of the causes of statelessness are when there is discrimination against
particular ethnic or religious groups or on the basis of gender; when new States emerge, or there
are transfers between existing States; and also when the State’s nationality laws are exclusive.30
Dissolution and Emergence of New States. When a state dissolves into two or more
states, often residents cannot secure citizenship under the restrictive and sometimes
UN, “Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,” op. cit.
Both 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness will be explained and discussed in the following section (II).
30
UNHCR, “Statelessness Around the World,” accessed and verified on September 17, 2020,
from https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statelessness-around-the-world.html.
28
29
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discriminatory laws of the new states, or if the successor states lack the administrative capacity
to register their residents or do not afford them sufficient time to register. For instance, from
1989 to 1992, there was the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the process of leading up to the
current fifteen independent republics, each successor state created new citizenship laws, which
led to creation of a significant number of stateless populations.31

Understanding State’s Role in Addressing Inclusion vs. Exclusion Policies. When
dealing with minorities, governments have two basic options: 1) inclusion and 2) exclusion.
According to the UN’s 2016 report Leaving no one behind: The imperative of inclusive
development, in the section about ‘Identifying Social Inclusion and Exclusion, in Chapter 1,
‘social inclusion’ is defined as a process to bring people who have been socially excluded and
helping them “gain the opportunities and resources necessary to participate fully in economic,
social, political and cultural life and to enjoy a standard of living that is considered normal in the
society in which they live.”32 In other words, ‘social inclusion’ is about granting individual or
collective rights, and creating policies of assimilation. On the other hand, ‘social exclusion’ is
defined as when “individuals are unable to participate fully in economic, social, political and
cultural life, as well as the process leading to and sustaining such a state.”33 Basically, social
exclusion is when you exclude and outcast minorities from everything such as economic, social,
political, and cultural opportunities and recognition. A couple of the contemporary cases that
illustrate this are Rohingyas of Myanmar, Muslims in India, and Uighurs in China.
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De Jure versus De facto
Prior to the passing of the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Stateless Convention of
1954, stateless people were also considered as refugees. It was only after the Refugee and
Stateless Conventions were passed, two were defined and recognized as separate categories. The
creation of separate categories created a confusion and a need for clarifications on which
convention to apply, and how to not only deal with the newly created categories of people, but
also people who fall into grey categories between the refugee and stateless. One of such
confusions was people in grey categories from the stateless category: de jure and de facto.
De jure. As defined from the 1954 Convention, the de jure s tatelessness is when a
“person [is] not considered a national (or citizen) automatically under the laws of any State.”34
Simply put, stateless by law.
De facto. T
 he concept and international definition of de facto statelessness remain
unaddressed as it was not included when Conventions on Statelessness was drafted and passed.
In 2010, UNHCR’s Senior legal adviser Hugh Massey defined and conceptualized it as “persons
outside the country of their nationality who are unable or, for valid reasons, are unwilling to avail
themselves of the protection of that country.”35 It is an expanded concept of de jure stateless that
one can be stateless even while possessing a nationality because they (1) do not enjoy the rights
attached to their nationality; or are unable to establish their nationality, or (2) are of
undetermined nationality; or (3) in the context of State succession, are attributed the nationality
of a State other than the State of their habitual residence.

Hugh Massey, “Legal and Protection Policy Research Series: UNHCR And De Facto Statelessness,” UNHCR,
LPPR/2010/01 (April 2010): 1, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020.
https://www.unhcr.org/4bc2ddeb9.pdf.
35
ibid, 61.
34
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Thus, to date (2020), the concept of de jure and de facto statelessness are still debated.
Currently, only de jure stateless people benefit under Article 1 of the Statelessness Convention
and are granted protections under international law.
V.

Conclusion & Outlook on Statelessness
As of 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated there to be

more than 12 million stateless people.36 These stateless people around the world are not only
vulnerable to neglect, discrimination, and persecution, but also challenged daily because of their
status and many of their natural rights are limited. In addition, with states claiming the right to
Westphalian sovereignty, there is often no legal protection for the stateless. Through policies of
social exclusion they are deprived of their basic human rights, as well as others addressed and
stressed in the UN treaties and conventions, such as the right to education, employment, housing,
healthcare, and identity and travel documents. But they are also vulnerable when they flee. One
of the most common issues faced by the stateless people is that their host states are not issuing
identity documents to them, despite their obligations under the 1954 Convention on the Status of
Stateless Persons requiring them to do so.37 Furthermore, stateless people are prone to prolonged
and unwarranted imprisonment when the host state fails to address these people by either
including them into their state or deporting them to another state.38
States are just as much as responsible for the creation and issue of statelessness. As a key
actor in the international human rights regime, it is critical for states to start recognizing
UN, “'12 Million' Stateless People Globally, Warns UNHCR Chief in Call to States for Decisive,” November 12,
2018, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/11/1025561.
37
Louise Osborne and Ruby Russell, “Stateless in Europe: 'We Are No People with No Nation',” The Guardian,
March 16, 2016, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/27/stateless-in-europe-refugee-crisis-we-are-no-people-with-no-natio
n.
38
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statelessness as an issue, taking responsibility in addressing the issue of statelessness, and
protecting the stateless people’s human rights. In the next chapter, I am going to introduce an
alternate system, which was designed and intended to be a level above the states, centered on the
United Nations (UN) system. Next, I will provide and lay out its anatomy and human rights
instruments. Then, to better understand the UN's institutional formation and change from 1945 to
present, I will be using historical institutionalism analysis. Lastly, from the insights drawn from
the past historical “critical junctures” in the UN's history, I will demonstrate how the UN was
path dependent to fail and its ability to protect all people were limited by critical flaws within its
design.
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CHAPTER 3 – INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: IN THE UN
I.

Introduction
In the previous Chapter, I argued how Westphalian sovereignty is still a very much active

and relevant principle in world politics, and how it has established how states control how they
treat their citizens. On the flip side, I am going to introduce the alternative system that was
designed to be a level above the states post-WWII—the United Nations. As a forefront
international governmental organization (IGO) that mentions and promotes the protection of
human rights seven times in its founding Charter, and sets one of its objectives as to uphold the
international laws and treaties in its preamble to its Charter, the United Nations is the one and
only IGO that can be held accountable for our international human rights. Furthermore, for the
past 70 years, it was and still is the only IGOthat has the most member states world-wide, with
the potential to promote and protect human rights internationally. Still, to hypothesize why the
current international human rights regime39 looks the way it does today, I am going to evaluate
the development of that regime from its origins in the United Nations.
Since it was created in 1945, the International human rights regime has not been static. It
has changed throughout history. Especially right after WWII (1945 to 1947), during the Cold
War (1947 to 1991), and American Unipolarity (1991–2009), the international human rights
regime experienced major international systemic changes or critical junctures as an institution.
Like other international regimes, the human rights regime has also rapidly changed in recent
decades. From 2010 to 2020, Seth D. Kaplan describes our international system as a Multipolar

39
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leader of IGOs.
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structure.40 After examining these critical junctures, in this chapter I will discuss the path
dependent implications of the UN's design and capability of protecting human rights which has
retrogressed over time. This chapter will be broken down in the following order: the Anatomy of
the UN; UN Human Rights Instruments; and lastly, UN’s Institutional Evolution.
II.

The Anatomy of the UN
What started off with only 51 nations in 1945, with many still colonized in Asia, the

Middle East, and both North and Sub-Saharan Africa, today there are 193 countries out of 195
UN recognized sovereign countries participating in the United Nations (UN).41 Each member
state participates in the UN differently. While many states play an active role in the UN's
principal organs and/or its subsidiary organs, others participate in different forms and types such
as the international conventions, treaties, and international organizations.
The UN Charter first established the six principal organs – a General Assembly, a
Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court
of Justice and a Secretariat. Over time, its subsidiary organs, bodies, agencies, and programs
were established when found necessary. As of 2020, under its five active principal organs,
namely the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the
International Court of Justice and the Secretariat, there are also a variety of new subsidiary
organs, specialized agencies, commissions, departments, and offices.42 For a visual
representation of the UN’s system, see Figure 1: UN system on the following page.
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Figure 1: The UN System
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UN General Assembly (UNGA)
The UN General Assembly serves as the UN’s hub for all of its 193 member States’
representatives to meet, discuss, and work together on international issues, such as development,
peace, and security, and international law.43 In terms of structure and design, the United Nations
General Assembly was designed as the general debate arena where all UN members would be
equally represented according to a one-state, one-vote formula. Meeting annually, the Assembly
coordinates and manages all UN programs and subsidiary bodies, elections for non-permanent
positions for other organs, and makes recommendations to its members via resolutions, such as
those on peace and security, admission of new members and budgetary matters.
UNGA also oversees three subsidiary human rights institutions: the Offices of the High
Commissioner for Refugees, the Human Rights Council (HRC), and the Third Committee of the
General Assembly. As a promising organ with a considerable amount of human rights
instruments that can locate, examine, and monitor human rights crises around the world, the
Charter limits UNGA’s function and power to making recommendations or resolutions to
promote international political cooperation, the development and codification of international
law, the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and international collaboration in
the economic, social, humanitarian, cultural, educational and health fields.44 Equivalent to
legislation, according to the UN, “resolutions are formal expressions of the opinion or will of UN
organs;” not a law.45 In the form of an opinion, rulings or recommendations for the action to be
taken, the UN Resolutions are issued by UN bodies.46 In terms of legal force, the issuing body of
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a UN resolution determines if it is considered binding on member states.47 General Assembly
resolutions are generally considered to be non-binding.
When it comes to maintaining international peace and security the Security Council described below - is the primary organ responsible.48 Still, the General Assembly can make
inquiries and studies with respect to conflicts,49 make recommendations, and also has a right to
be kept informed by the Security Council and the Secretary-General.50
UN Security Council (UNSC)
Under Article 24 of the Charter, the primary responsibility for maintaining international
peace and security is mandated to the Security Council (UNSC).51 What uniquely sets apart the
UNSC from other principal organs and bodies is that, under the Charter, it has the authority and
power to act on behalf of all members of the United Nations; make decisions that member states
are then obligated to implement under the Charter; and the international jurisdiction to take
military action against an aggressor (See Figure 2 for full list of UNSC’s functions and powers
below). Meanwhile, the other organs and bodies of the United Nations can only make
recommendations to member states.

Figure 2: UNSC’s functions and powers (Next page)
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UNSC’s Functions and Powers
●

●

●

When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before UNSC: the UNSC has the powers to
o

Set forth principles for such an agreement;

o

Undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;

o

Dispatch a mission;

o

Appoint special envoys; or

o

Request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the
dispute.

To End Disputes/Hostilities: the UNSC has the powers to
o

Issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;

o

Dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing
forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.

Other Enforcement Measures: include
o

Economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans;

o

Severance of diplomatic relations;

o

Blockade;

o

Or even collective military action.

(UN, “Functions and Powers,” https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/functions-and-powers)

Membership. UNSC membership was kept small so that the decision-making process
dealing with threats to national peace and security will be more efficient. There were originally
11 members consisting of five permanent members, the United States, Republic of China (today,
PRC), the United Kingdom, France, and USSR (today, the Russian Federation) and six
non-permanent members. The designation of permanent members partly had to do with the
distribution of military power in 1945 and the desire to ensure the UN's ability to respond
quickly and decisively to any aggression. Politically, neither the superpowers like the United
States nor the Soviet Union would have accepted UN membership without a veto power. Now,
as of 2020, the UNSC is composed of 15 members: five permanent members, and ten
non-permanent members, who are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly.52
52
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Functions. Both Chapter VI of the Charter, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, and Chapter
VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression,
describes the UNSC’s role in depth.53 Chapter VI provides a list of ways to investigate disputes
and help parties achieve peaceful settlements. Chapter VII identifies the UNSC’s authority to
commit all the UN members with enforcement measures such as sanctions or military force.
Ad Hoc War Crimes Tribunals. Since WWII, the UN has been involved with the
establishment of several tribunals. The first international criminal tribunals, also known as the
International Military Tribunals, were established in Nuremberg, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan,
from 1945-1948.54 They were created by the victors of WWII, to punish individuals responsible
for war crimes in WWII. After the Cold War era ended in 1991, with no more conflict of interest
between and vetoing by the United States and Russia, the very concept of punishing individuals
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity resurfaced again because of the
atrocities that were present in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This concept was a revival of the
Nuremberg focus on individual responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
ICTY and ICTR. T
 o bring justice for the victims and to punish individuals responsible for
war crimes, the UNSC established two ad hoc criminal tribunals: International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993;55 and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.56 During their time both ICTY and ICTR have accomplished in
elaborating on the Geneva Conventions, setting precedents for international court procedure and
humanitarian laws.
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The ICTY was established to prosecute serious crimes committed during the conflicts in
the Balkans, taking place in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina in the 1990s, also known as,
Yugoslav Wars.57 The “thousands of civilians being killed and wounded, tortured and sexually
abused in detention camps and hundreds of thousands expelled from their homes,” according to
ICTY, distressed the international community and ultimately led the UNSC to act.58 ICTY was
founded in 1993 and based in the Hague, Netherlands. The ICTY was made up of three main
branches: the Chambers, the Registry, and the Office of the Prosecutor.
As a tribunal, the ICTY has achieved indicting over 160 persons, including the heads of
state, prime ministers, army chiefs-of-staff, interior ministers and mid to high-level political,
military and police leaders from various parties to the Yugoslav conflicts.59 Internationally, the
ICTY achieved developing procedures for establishing the relevant facts, providing victims a
forum in which to be heard, and fleshing out the international laws on war crimes, genocide, and
torture.60 As the first tribunal of its kind, it paved the way for other future international courts
such as ICTR and the International Criminal Court (ICC), providing a body of jurisprudence and
procedures. After completing its mandate in the Netherlands, the ICTY was dissolved on
December 31, 2017.
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
A year after ICTY was established in 1993, ICTR was also created by UNSC to judge
people responsible for committing genocide, war crimes, and/or crimes against humanity during
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the Rwandan genocide in 1994.61 Around eight-hundred thousand to one million Tutsi men,
women and children are estimated to have been murdered during the genocide in 1994.62 The
UNSC decided to locate the ICTR in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania. ICTR also had
offices in Kigali, Rwanda. Its Appeals Chamber is in the Hague, Netherlands. Like ICTY, the
ICTR is made up of three main organs: the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the
Registry.
As a tribunal the ICTR has indicted 93 individuals, including high-ranking military and
government officials, politicians, businessmen, as well as religious, militia, and media leaders,
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda in 1994.63
Internationally, the ICTR has achieved becoming the first tribunal internationally to not only (1)
“[deliver] verdicts in relation to genocide, and interpret the definition of genocide set forth in the
1948 Geneva Conventions,” but also (2) “define rape in international criminal law and to
recognize rape as a means of perpetrating genocide.”64 After completing its mandate in the
United Republic of Tanzania and also that of its appeals chamber in the Netherlands, the ICTR
was dissolved on December 31, 2015.
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), one of the UN’s six original principal
organs, is the most complex and central platform for addressing and identifying solutions to
international economic, social and environmental issues. Despite being the least visible of the
61
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important elements in the UN structure, in fact, ECOSOC coordinates and oversees the economic
and social activities of the UN system that make up more than 70 percent of human and financial
resources of the UN system.65 ECOSOC’s wide array of works also includes encouraging
universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
UN Secretariat
The Secretariat, one of the principal organs of the UN, has a wide range of roles and
activities within the UN as an administrative body. The Secretary-General (SG) is the chief
administrative officer and head of the Secretariat.
The UN defines the SG as a “symbol of United Nations ideals and a spokesman for the
interests of the world's peoples, in particular the poor and vulnerable among them.”66 The Charter
lists the SG’s powers and empowers the SG to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any
matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."67
According to the UN, what defines the powers of the office and grants it considerable scope for
action are these guidelines. The Secretary-General would fail if he did not take careful account of
the concerns of Member States, but he must also uphold the values and moral authority of the
United Nations, and speak and act for peace, even at the risk, from time to time, of challenging
or disagreeing with those same Member States. Each Secretary-General also defines his role
within the context of his particular time in office.
With the Secretariat’s wide-ranging offices and departments, it coordinates and organizes
all the work of the UN in offices and duty stations around the world and assists the work of other
principal bodies: UNGA, UNSC, ICJ, ECOSOC, and the defunct Trusteeship Council. Out of the
65

Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, “The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law,” Doctors without borders, December
2013, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/the-economic-and-social-council-of-the-un-ecosoc/.
66
UN, “The Role of the Secretary-General,” accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/role-secretary-general.
67
ibid

Lee 39

Secretariat’s offices and department, the entity that is in charge of human rights is the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights (described below).
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
As one of the six principal UN organs established under the founding Charter, the ICJ
also shares responsibility along with other major organs to protect and preserve the UN
principles and interests detailed in the Charter. The ICJ’s main role is serving as an impartial
judicial body that helps States settle legal disputes and to give advisory opinions.68
How the Court Works. With the power bestowed by the UN Charter, the ICJ can only
hear or start cases when: (1) legal disputes between States are submitted to it (contentious cases);
and (2) by referral from United Nations organs and specialized agencies requesting for advisory
opinions on legal questions (advisory proceedings) .69
Jurisdiction. As a court, ICJ has non-compulsory jurisdiction. This means that to bring a
case to the court, the States that are in dispute all must agree to submit a case to the court.70
Basically, a member State cannot be forced to appear before the court unless it agrees to comply.
Only when it does agree, the ICJ’s decision holds any legal powers. For instance, in 2010,
Australia accused Japan of breaching its obligation under the 1946 International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling and of other international obligations for the preservation of marine
mammals and the marine environment, by over hunting whales.71 Japan was found guilty in
2014. ICJ ordered Japan to “revoke any extant authorization, permit or license to kill, take or
treat whales in relation” to the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the
Antarctic, as well as “to refrain from granting any further permits under Article VIII, paragraph
68
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1, of the Convention, in pursuance of that program.”72 A counter-example of a State refusing to
participate is The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America in 1986. It was a case
where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the U.S. had violated international law by
supporting the Contras in their rebellion against the Sandinistas and by mining Nicaragua's
harbors.73 The US refused to participate in the proceedings after the Court rejected its argument
that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. On April 6, 1984, the US attempted a partial
withdrawal from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. On October 7, 1985, US President Ronald
Regan terminated the United States acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction to be effective six
months later. The U.S. also blocked enforcement of the judgment by the United Nations Security
Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any compensation.74
Human Rights. ICJ is not a human rights court. It does not have any mechanism to
“promote and protect” human rights. However, when human rights are framed as part of
promoting “international peace and security,” the ICJ can consider a dispute that stems from
human rights claims. For instance, in 2004, the ICJ ruled in an advisory opinion on the legal
consequences arising from a wall that Israel constructed in Palestinian territory under Israeli
occupation, that Israel violated several important provisions of the 1949 Fourth Geneva
Convention, and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as of the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child.75 Voting 13-2, the judges found that all States should not "recognize the
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall" and not give any aid or assistance in
72
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maintaining the situation.76 Although the decision was non-binding, this advisory decision is an
example of how ICJ can consider a dispute that stems from human rights claims and promote
international peace and security and protect human rights.
International Criminal Court (ICC)
On July 17, 1998, 120 States adopted the ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court in Rome’ (“the Rome Statute”). After 60 States ratified the Rome Statute, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) was officially established and effectively began functioning in 2002.77
Unlike the international tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR which had individual mandates and
were temporary, the establishment of the ICC was an effort to create a permanent international
criminal court that would hold wider jurisdiction and specialize on four main crimes: genocide;
crimes against humanity; war crimes; and crime of aggression. As an IGO, the ICC is officially
recognized as an independent permanent judicial institution. However, it still reports its activities
to and cooperates with the UN Secretary-General, the UNGA, and UNSC. In accordance with
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council
can refer certain situations to the Prosecutor of the ICC.78 Some of the major countries that did
not adopt the Rome Statute are China, India, Iraq, Turkey, the United States and Myanmar.79
Structure and Jurisdiction. U
 nlike its predecessors — the ICTY and the ICTR — the ICC
has four principal organs: the Presidency, the Judicial Divisions, the Office of the Prosecutor,
and the Registry.80 In contrast to the ICJ, the ICC enjoys both compulsory and over individual
jurisdictions. Basically, this means that ICC, as a court, not only has jurisdiction to pursue any
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individuals (except those under 18 years of age) from the participating State Party, including
heads of state and military leaders or in the territory of a State Party, but also crimes that were
committed in a State that has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.81 In addition, the ICC can
also accept cases and jurisdiction from UNSC. Four types of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
ICC are genocide (attacking a group of people and killing them because of race, ethnicity,
religion), crimes against humanity (murder, enslavement, forcible transfer of population, torture),
war crimes, and crimes of aggression.82
Role. The ICC’s main role in the international human rights regime is “to end impunity,
and through international criminal justice, the Court aims to hold those responsible accountable
for their crimes and to help prevent these crimes from happening again.”83 As a complementary
court, “ICC prosecutes cases only when the responsible state’s national courts do not and are
unwilling or unable to do so genuinely” and fail to deal with grave atrocities.84 Cases can also be
referred by the UNSC, which grants ICC jurisdiction.85 The mandate of the Chief Prosecutor and
the Office of Prosecutor is to independently and impartially select situations for investigation
where atrocity crimes are or have been committed on their territories or by their nationals.
According to ICC, there are 27 cases before the Court.86 The main critiques of ICC are that it is
inefficient, excessively expensive, and ineffective.87
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Figure 3: Human Rights in UN Organs
Principal Organ

Human Rights

General Assembly

● The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (OHCR) 88
o Protects and assists refugees everywhere with clean water, sanitation and
healthcare, as well as shelter, blankets, household goods and sometimes food.
o Arranges transport and assistance packages for people who return home, and
income-generating projects for those who resettle.
● The Human Rights Council (HRC)89
o HRC addresses situations of human rights violations and makes
recommendations on them. Its main role and ability is to discuss all thematic
human rights issues and situations.
o Special Procedures
▪ Independent experts who examine, monitor, publicly report and advise on
human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective for the HRC.
● Third Committee of the General Assembly (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)
o Examines a range of issues, including human rights questions.
● Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide raises awareness of the causes and
dynamics of genocide, to alert relevant actors where there is a risk of genocide, and to
advocate and mobilize for appropriate action
● Special Advisers on the Responsibility to Protect leads the conceptual, political,
institutional and operational development of the Responsibility to Protect in states.
● UN Peacekeeping Operations
o Many peacekeeping operations and political and peace building missions
include human rights-related mandates to protect and promote human rights,
such as empowering the population to assert and claim their human rights; and
enabling State and other national institutions to implement their human rights
obligations and uphold the rule of law.
● United Nations Secretary-General address a range of human rights issues and appoint
special representatives, who advocate against major human rights violations:
o Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed
Conflict
o Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
o Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence Against Children
● The Offices of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
o Human Rights Treaty Bodies: are committees of independent experts that
monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties, such as
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.90
o UN Development Group’s Human Rights Mainstreaming
Mechanism (UNDG-HRM): advances human rights mainstreaming efforts
within the UN development system.
● Commission on the Status of Women: promotes gender equality and the advancement
of women

Security Council

Secretariat
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Economic and
Social Council
(ECOSOC)

International
Court of Justice
(ICJ)92

● With its other subsidiary organs ECOSOC makes policy decisions and
recommendations to Member States, the United Nations system and other actors.
o I.e. The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII)
is an advisory body to ECOSOC and has a mandate to discuss indigenous
issues, including human rights.
● Commission on Human Rights (1946-2006)91 the UN’s international forum and
mechanism mandated to promote and protect human rights
o Examined, monitored and publicly reported on human rights situations in
specific/mandated countries.
o Elaborated on human rights standard
o Drafted and established the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
● Composed of 15 judges, ICJ settles, in accordance with international law, legal disputes
submitted to it by States and gives advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by
authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.
● ICJ is not a human rights court and does not have any mechanism to “promote and
protect” rights
● However, according to Dr. Lyal S. Sunga from the Hague Institute of Global Justice,
“since 2004 however, ICJ rulings seem to signal greater willingness on the part of the
Court to apply established norms of international human rights and humanitarian law in
disputes brought before it.”93

(UN, “Protect Human Rights,” https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/)

III.

UN HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
The above list of principal organs and their subsidiary organs, bodies, agencies, and

programs in Figure 3 illustrates the most up-to-date list of human rights instruments, the UN has
developed to promote and to protect human rights over the years. Each of these instruments were
created at various times when the UN found it to be necessary. As new instruments were being
developed, so were some of the older instruments abandoned as well. To diagnose the problems
or flaws within the international human rights regime and to understand why it looks the way it
does today, according to Historical Institutionalism analysis, an examination of the origins of the

91

In 2006, the Human Rights Council replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights. For more information, see
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights on p.50 of this thesis.
92
ICJ, “The Court: International Court of Justice,”accessed and verified on March 15, 2020,
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/court.
93
The Hague Institute for Global Justice, “The International Court of Justice's Growing Contribution to Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law,” April 18, 2016, accessed and verified on March 15, 2020,
https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/latest-insights/latest-insights/commentary/the-international-courtof-justices-growing-contribution-to-human-rights-and-humanitarian-law/.

Lee 45

human rights system and how institutions evolved over time is a key.94 So from 1943 to present,
various critical human rights centered institutions will be discussed in chronological order.
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (1943-47)
It was in 1943, during WWII and and before the UN, when the first human rights
instrument was founded – the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
(UNRRA). The UNRRA was created to address the large group of persecuted, homeless or
stateless people who were displaced as a result of the ongoing WWII at the time. After the
agreement of 44 nations (the so-called “United Nations”), the UNRRA was founded and largely
dominated by the United States, to “plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration
of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United
Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical
and other essential services” in 1943.95 In short, UNRRA’s role as a human rights instrument was
to provide emergency assistance and to promote repatriation.
UNRRA officially became part of the United Nations in 1945. Entering the Cold War, it
ceased operations in 1947. Today, some of the UN agencies like the International Refugee
Organization, UNHCR, and the World Health Organization transferred and absorbed the
UNRRA’s role.
UN Commission on Human Rights (1946-2006)
In 1946, the UN Economic and Social Council created its first human rights instrument to
uphold international law and to protect fundamental rights and freedoms: the United Nations
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Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).96 The UN mandated the UNCHR to “examine,
monitor and publicly report either on human rights situations in specific countries or territories
(known as country mechanisms or mandates) or on major phenomena of human rights violations
worldwide (known as thematic mechanisms or mandates).”97 Out of the ECOSOC’s nine
commissions, it was the most active commission.98 In the course of six decades, UNCHR
achieved in creating the nine core international human rights treaties (See Figure 4 for
breakdown of the Nine Core International Human Rights Treaties).
Figure 4: UNCHR’s Nine Core International Human Rights Treaties (next page)
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Date of Entry into
Force99
January 4, 1969
March 23, 1976
January 3, 1976
September 3, 1981
June 26, 1987
September 2, 1990

UNCHR’s Nine Core International Human Rights Treaties
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
Convention on the Rights of the Child

July 1, 2003

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families

May 3, 2008

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

December 23, 2010

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance

(UNCHR, “The Core International Human Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies,”
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx)

On June 16, 2006, UNCHR was officially terminated. The UN Human Rights Council
replaced many of its tasks on March 15, 2006 (described below).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (1950-Present)
After UNRRA disbanded, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) was established by UNGA on December 14, 1950 to continue helping
millions of Europeans who had fled or lost their homes and resumed some of the UNRRA’s
tasks. UNHCR is governed by two principal organs, the UN General Assembly and the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Initially, the UNHCR was mandated to lead and
coordinate international action to protect refugees, resolve refugee problems worldwide, and then
99
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to disband in three years.100 However, as multiple cases of humanitarian crises kept arising, in
2003, the organization’s mandate was extended by the General Assembly “until the refugee
problem is solved.”101 To this day, the UNHCR actively assists vulnerable refugees,
asylum-seekers, internally displaced and stateless people and annually reports102 back to the
Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council. The UNHCR's mission is “to ensure that
everyone can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the
option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country.”103
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (1993-Present)
By far, the leading human rights entity in the UN is the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). In 1993, the position of High Commissioner of the OHCHR was
established by the UNGA and entrusted with a mandate to promote and protect all human rights
for all people. The OHCHR mainly reports to the Secretary-General and works with the Human
Rights Council104 as well. What the OHCHR does can be broken down to four parts: (1)
Mainstreaming human rights; (2) Partnerships; (3) Standard-setting and monitoring; and (4)
Implementation on the ground. 105
Mainstreaming human rights. The OCHR is tasked with mainstreaming human rights
within the United Nations, which means injecting a human rights perspective into all United
Nations programs. At the United Nations World Summit in 2005, world leaders reaffirmed the
100
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leading role and mandate of OHCHR in responding to the broad range of human rights
challenges facing the international community today.106
Partnerships. T
 o fulfill its mandate of promoting and protecting human rights, according
to UN, the OCHR works with “governments, civil society, national human rights institutions and
other United Nations entities and international organizations, such as the International Labour
Organization, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Children's
Fund, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International
Criminal Court, specialized criminal tribunals, such as the ones for former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda, established by the Security Council, and the World Bank.”107
Standard-setting and monitoring. T
 he OHCHR’s method of work focuses on three major
dimensions: standard-setting, monitoring, and implementation on the ground. The OHCHR
provides the best expertise, and substantive and secretariat support to the different United
Nations human rights bodies as they discharge their standard-setting and monitoring duties.
OHCHR, for example, serves as the Secretariat of the Human Rights Council. The Council,
consisting of State representatives, is the key United Nations intergovernmental body responsible
for human rights (and is described in more detail below). The OHCHR also supports the work of
special procedures, special rapporteurs, independent experts, and working groups-- appointed by
the Council to monitor human rights in different countries or in relation to specific issues. The
OHCHR also assists the independent experts as they carry out visits to the field, receive and
consider direct complaints from victims of human rights violations, and appeal to governments
on behalf of victims.
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Implementation on the ground. The OHCHR ensures the implementation of international
human rights standards on the ground through greater country engagement and its field
presences. Over the years, OHCHR has also increased its presence in the field, reaching out to
the people who need it the most. Its field offices and presences play an essential role in
identifying, highlighting, and developing responses to human rights challenges, in close
collaboration with governments, the United Nations system, non-governmental organizations,
and members of civil society. Among these responses are monitoring human rights situations on
the ground and implementing projects, such as technical training and support in the areas of
administration of justice, legislative reform, human rights treaty ratification, and human rights
education, designed in cooperation with member States.
UN Human Rights Council (2006-Present)
On March 15, 2006, the UNGA gave birth to the UN Human Rights Council (“Human
Rights Council”). This replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights (“UNCHR”), officially
abolishing the UNCHR on June 16, 2006. The Human Rights Council’s members were elected
by the majority of members of the General Assembly through direct and secret ballot.108
As of 2020, the Human Rights Council is made up of 47 United Nations Member
States.109 Assuming much of the UNCHR’s work, the Human Rights Council is responsible for
“strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for addressing
situations of human rights violations and making recommendations on them.”110
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To assess the human rights situations in all United Nations Member States, the Human
Rights Council developed the Universal Periodic Review mechanism.111 This mechanism allows
the Human Rights Council and its advisory committee to focus and address thematic human
rights issues and the complaint procedure — the process where individuals and organizations can
bring human rights violations to the attention of the Human Rights Council. The Human Rights
Council also works with the UN Special Procedures — made up of special rapporteurs, special
representatives, independent experts and working groups that monitor, examine, advise and
publicly report on thematic issues or human rights situations in specific countries. Some of the
thematic issues the special rapporteurs report on are water and sanitation, arbitrary detention, the
rights of migrants, violence against women, torture and human trafficking.112
IV.

UN’S INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
Since 1945, the UN grew more complex institutionally, and its human rights institutions

expanded not only in size, but also their scope of work which covered more crimes and issues.
Earlier, I identified the following four critical junctures, moments of changes in the international
system, when the UN experienced the most institutional changes within its evolution as right
after WWII (1945 to 1947), during the Cold War (1947 to 1991), American Unipolarity
(1991–2009), and Multipolar structure (2009 to the present). Some of the key causal qualities
and/or variables that I will be tracking across the four time periods within the UN’s evolution
are: number of new institutions created in general; number of IGOs eliminated; number of
human rights-centered institutions created; and lastly, human rights mechanisms created, such as
treaties and treaty bodies.
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From WWII, one would think that the UN and international human rights would be better
protected today than when it was first created in 1945. However, based on how the UN has either
handled and/or neglected several past humanitarian crises, I will argue that over time, it is
actually functioning worse.
From 1947 through 2000, there were many IGO ‘births,’ and ‘deaths.’ (See Figure 5 for
breakdown of the Twentieth Century Growth of IGOs).
Figure 5: Twentieth Century Growth of IGOs (1850 - 2000) (Next page)
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(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, “IGO births, deaths, and overall population growth, 1850–2005,” Death of
international organizations : the organizational ecology of intergovernmental organizations, 1815–2015, T
 he
review of international organizations, 2018, OnlineFirst, p.14
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The blue line, labeled as ‘BIRTHS,’ represents and tracks the number of IGO that was
created at that respective time. The red line, labeled as ‘DEATHS,’ represents and tracks the
number of IGO that was terminated at that respective time. The green line, labeled as “POPL,”
represents and tracks the total number of IGOs that existed at that respective time.
UN (1945 – 1947)
Following the end of WWII and the creation of the UN, as illustrated with the blue line,
labeled as ‘BIRTHS,’ in Figure 5, from 1945 through 1947, the Union of International
Associations estimated there to be around 20+ new IGO International Governmental
Organizations (IGOs). By 1947, as illustrated with the green line, labeled as ‘POPL,’ there were
about 80+ IGOs, inside and outside the UN, regional, and transregional. This included creation
of some of the major IGOs, such as the UNESCO (1945), UNICEF (1946), and IMF (1944, but
began operation in 1947). In terms of IGO termination, from 1945 through 1947, around 10
IGOs are estimated to have been eliminated. During this critical juncture, only two human rights
institutions were established: the UNRRA, and the UNCHR.
Some of the key events in the development of the UN during this critical juncture were
the beginning of Nuremberg war trials (1945) and Tokyo International military tribunal (1946);
US officially submitting to jurisdiction of World Court (ICJ) (1946); and lastly, signing of WWII
peace treaties (1947).
Cold War (1947 – 1991)
Background
The Cold War ensued in 1947, after the US introduced the Truman Doctrine to fight
communism. Some of the major IGOs that either were established or went into effect during this
critical juncture were North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1949); European Convention
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on Human Rights (1953); and lastly, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
(1975). In this critical juncture alone, there are two major wars: the Korean War (1950 -) and the
Vietnam War (1954 - 1975).
Analysis
From 1947 to 1970, as shown in Figure 5, the number of new IGOs were increased by
over three-fold (270+), and around 20+ IGOs eliminated in the process. As for changes in the
human rights-centered institutions, the UNRRA was replaced in 1947 and the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees was established in 1950. During this period, the following five
human rights mechanisms were both adopted and entered in force: Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951); Convention relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons (1954); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1954); Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, Institutions and Practices Similar to
Slavery (1957); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967); and International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969).
Figure 6: Human Rights Conventions (1947 - 1991) (next page)
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Treaty

Effective
Year

Number of
Countries
Ratified
(2020)

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

1951

152113

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

1954

146114

Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

1957

124115

1967

147116

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

1969

182117

1976

173118

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

1976

171119

International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
Convention on the Rights of the Child

1976

109120

1981

189121

1987

171122

1990

196123

Convention concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent
1991
23124
countries
(“Human Rights Conventions (1947 - 1991),” https://treaties.un.org/, compiled by the author)

From 1970 to 1991, as shown in Figure 5, the number of IGOs increased by 80 (350+)
and around 35+ IGOs were eliminated. As for human rights-centered institutions, there were no
major changes. During this period, the following seven human rights mechanisms were both
adopted and entered in force: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976);
113
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976); International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1976); Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981); Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987); Convention
on the Rights of the Child (1990); and lastly, Convention concerning indigenous and tribal
peoples in independent countries (1991).
From 1947 through 1991, there was an explosive growth of IGOs created in especially
two periods in 1947 to 1970 and in 1970 to 1991. Collectively from 1947 to 1991, there were
twelve human rights conventions adopted and effective in total. Some scholars may wonder why,
during a time of bipolar international conflict and lack of consensus, would there be so much
growth of international institutions. As Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni—in her contribution to study
on IGO births, deaths, and overall population growth— theorized that “states often prefer[red] to
create new IGOs as opposed reforming existing ones” and also “that having a large and
heterogeneous membership is associated with greater organizational survivability,”125 I
hypothesize that this creation of new IGOs and general growth of international institutions
during the Cold War was most likely the states’ doing and an attempt to keep the international
regime alive. As to why the states would be interested in keeping the IGOs alive, I hypothesize
that it was most likely because having and participating in IGOs benefitted the states in
individual ways.

Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, “Death of international organizations: the organizational ecology of
intergovernmental organizations,” 1815–2015, The review of international organizations, 2018, OnlineFirst
Retrieved from Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository, at: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/60598
125

Lee 58

American Unipolarity (1991–2009)
Figure 7: Twentieth Century Growth of IGOs (1945 - 2017)

(Union of International Associations, “International organizations' foundings, 1945 to 2017,”
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/International-organizations-foundings-1945-2017-Source-UIA-own-sample-an
d-account-N_fig4_320531467)

Background
In 1991, following the collapse of Soviet Union, according to David Andrew Tizzard, the
world structure became unipolar and we had the rise of American Unipolarity.126 In essence, with
the USSR out of the way, the U.S. was the country with the “military might, cultural force, and
economic power” that can dominate the world.127 Some of the major IGOs that either were
established or went into effect during this critical juncture was the European Union (EU) in
1993; and the African Union (AU) in 2002. In particular, this critical juncture had many wars
David Andrew Tizzard, “American Unipolarity: The Uneven Distribution of Power,” Global Politics Review 3,
no. 2 (October 2017): pp. 10-25,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331650952_American_Unipolarity_The_Uneven_Distribution_of_Power.
127
ibid. p.12
126
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and humanitarian crises. There were nine humanitarian crises as a result of the following seven
wars: the Gulf War (1990-1991); Uprisings in Iraq (1991); Somali Civil War (1991-1993);
Burundian Civil War (1995-1996); Kosovo War (1998-1999); Third Congo Civil War
(1998-2003); Iraq War (2003 – 2011); and two ongoing wars: Afghanistan War (2001-ongoing)
and War in Darfur (2003-ongoing). There were three major genocides as well: the Bosnian
Genocide (1992-1995); the Rwandan Genocide (1994); and lastly, Darfur Genocide (2003 ongoing).
Figure 8: Human Rights Conventions (1991-2009)
Treaty

Effective
Year

Number of
Countries
Ratified
(2020)

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict

2002

170128

Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography

2002

176129

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families

2003

55130

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

2003

190131

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

2008

182132

(“Human Rights Conventions (1991 - 2009),” https://treaties.un.org/), compiled by the author.

Analysis
During the era of American Unipolarity, as illustrated in Figure 7, from 1991 through
2009, the Union of International Associations estimated there to be around 110+ new IGOs
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created, in total 510+ IGOs. As for changes in human rights-centered institutions, the UN High
Commissioners for Human Rights was established in 1993 and the UNCHR was replaced in
2006; and human rights courts such as courts ICTY was founded in 1993; ICTR was founded in
1994; and ICC was founded in 1998. During this period, the following five human rights
mechanisms were both adopted and entered in force: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2002); Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child
pornography (2002); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families (2003); and lastly, Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (2008).
2010 to 2020 (2010 – 2020)
Background
In 2009, following the decline of the US in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the
rise of other superpowers, such as China, according to Andrea Edoardo Varisco, the world
structure became Multipolar.133 Other superpowers began to challenge the U.S. For instance, in
Asia, China began to challenge the U.S, and in Europe, Russia challenged the U.S.134 From 2010
to 2020, there were five humanitarian crises as a result of the following five ongoing wars
Afghanistan War (2001-ongoing); War in Darfur (2003-ongoing); Syrian civil war (2011-);
Russo-Ukrainian War (2014-); an Yemeni Civil War (2015-). There are three major genocides as
well: the Genocide in South Sudan (2013-2020); and the ongoing Darfur Genocide (2003 ongoing); and the Rohingya Genocide (2016 - ongoing).

133

Andrea Edoardo Varisco, “Towards a Multi-Polar International System: Which Prospects for Global Peace?,”
E-International Relations, June 5, 2013,
https://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/03/towards-a-multi-polar-international-system-which-prospects-for-global-peace/.
134
ibid. p.12
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Figure 9: Human Rights Conventions (2010– 2017)
Treaty

Effective
Year

Number of
Countries
Ratified
(2020)

International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance

2010

63135

( “Human Rights Conventions (1991 - 2009),” https://treaties.un.org/),compiled by the author.

Analysis
Post-American Unipolarity, as illustrated in Figure 7, from 2010 through 2020, the Union
of International Associations estimated there to be around 60+ new IGOs created, in total 570+
IGOs. During this period, there were no changes in the human rights-centered institutions. Only
one human rights mechanism was both adopted and entered in force: International Convention
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance in 2010.
V.

Conclusion —Evaluation of the UN International Legal Regime’s Ability to
Protect Human Rights
In terms of growth and development, although the international regime and its human

rights institutions have both expanded in both size and proportion, as illustrated in both figures 5
and 7, it was very disproportionate. The regime itself experienced massive growth as much as
almost six-fold from what it started with. For instance, from 1945 to 2020, it started with around
80+ IGOs, but by 2020, there were more than 460+ IGOs. Meanwhile, as for its human rights
institutions, although it was able to gain additional institutions, it also lost two of its original
institutions. For example, in 1946, it started out with two IGOs, namely UNRRA and UNCHR.
However, by 2020, both UNRRA (1943-47) and UNCHR (1946-2006) were both disbanded and
the following three institutions and offices resumed their work: UN High Commissioner for
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Refugees (1950-Present), UN High Commissioners for Human Rights (1993-Present), and UN
Human Rights Council (2006-Present).
In terms of human rights instruments, as shown in figures 6, 7, and 9, from 1945 to 2020,
about 18 conventions and/or treaties (“Treaties”) were created to tackle various critical human
rights issues. But, more importantly, the number of states that signed and ratified each of these
critical Treaties varied disproportionately during different critical junctures. Although on
average, around 151 states signed and ratified the 18 Treaties, still some Treaties had as low as
23 states and as high as 196 states. In particular, the Cold War critical juncture had the most
fluctuations of states’ behavior in adherence as well as non-adherence, in signing and ratifying
treaties and becoming state parties. Interestingly, except for one of Treaties136, there were strong
levels of compliance, averaging around 180 states participation, during the American Unipolarity
critical juncture.
The UN’s abilities, capabilities, and efficiencies in addressing humanitarian crises and
protecting human rights first show signs of inefficiency during the Cold War critical juncture.
Although there were major increases in both the creation of IGOs and historical 12 human rights
Treaties, the UN’s handling of and/or immobility to act in the humanitarian crises in the Korean
War and the Vietnam War were early indicators. In between the two superpowers rivalry, the
Korean War and the Vietnam War indicated that the UN’s ability to address humanitarian crises
and to protect human rights was limited by design.
Post-Cold War, there was an expectation that the UN would perform more efficiently in
the absence of Cold War superpower rivalry. However, in contrast to the expectation, I observed
that nothing had really changed. Furthermore, the UN's human rights institutions still didn't
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protect people. Rather, in the contrary, it was during the post-Cold War critical junctures that
exemplified the effects of what happens when the UN’s ability to address humanitarian crises
and to protect human rights is limited. The effects of the UN’s inability were devastating. There
were nine humanitarian crises and three genocides just from 1990 to 2006, during the American
Unipolarity critical juncture. From 2010 to 2020, the international system’s power structure
shifted again, and yet there were five humanitarian crises as a result of five ongoing wars and
three genocides, which two genocides are still ongoing.
From my analysis above, there is enough indications and evidence to make the claim that
the UN as an institution and its instruments are simply not enough to protect the most vulnerable
people and their human rights. From the Cold War to present, despite many human rights
mechanisms and efforts made, they were simply not enough to prevent states from violating its
people’s human rights, wars, and various humanitarian crises from taking place. As a result of
these unresolved wars and humanitarian crises, since WWII, the number of asylum seekers,
refugees, and the stateless people has only been increasing rapidly over time. As of 2019,
according to the UN, there are more than 79.5 million people who are refugees, asylum seekers,
stateless, and internally displaced people. Other common causes that commit to these numbers
were due to religious, national, social, racial, and political persecutions, and both economic and
climate crises.
Upon evaluating and considering the UN’s anatomy, human rights institutions,
instruments, as well as its performance and institutional evolution from 1945 to present, I was
able to discover that there are multiple systemic design flaws that limited the UN’s ability to
protect all people. There are four design flaws which I was able to discover, which deal with
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overarching legal concepts of ‘jurisdiction’, ‘hierarchy of the world power,’ ‘competition,’ and
‘slow adaptation to change.’ This will be discussed in depth in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4 — DESIGN FLAWS
I.

Introduction
In light of everything that was discussed, analyzed, and evaluated in the previous

chapters, I theorize that the current international regime cannot keep up with our set expectations
to truly become the system that is above the states and to protect human rights, because the UN
had critical baked-in flaws within its institutional design, which allowed for Westphalian
Sovereignty and the hierarchy of world power to remain dominant. Unable to resolve these flaws
over time, it was path dependent to fail and still operates in a neo-realist way, where states try to
operate according to the principle of sovereignty and competition for world power. In particular,
the throughline in all of this is Westphalian Sovereignty. The essential nature of the international
regime is still based on state sovereignty and consent and is inescapable. The international
institutions are only as strong as the will of the state because the states, and especially the
superpowers, retain so much power. Over time, unable to subdue their power with the
international platform, the UN never really became bigger than that.
This Chapter will discuss the overarching legal concepts, with examples, of the following
four design flaws that I have identified: ‘jurisdiction’, ‘hierarchy of the world power,’
‘competition,’ and ‘slow adaptation to change’. In particular, each of these flaws are either what
the UN lacks within its institutional design, or simply what the designers of the UN either failed
to or intentionally did not account for when they were constructing the framework for the UN.
II.

Design Flaw #1: Jurisdiction
The first design flaw I was able to locate within the UN’s institutional design was the

UN’s limited jurisdiction in states’ affairs (Design Flaw #1). Tracing the UN’s design, the
Charter limits the UN’s jurisdiction in states’ affairs to mainly the UNSC and consent and treaty
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based, as well. For instance, it is written in Article 2 of Chapter 1, in the Charter, that “[n]othing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter ...”137 However, in the following line,
it made an exception to the UNSC, “... but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.”138 It was this article of the Charter, which basically
limited the right to intervene in states’ affairs to only the UNSC and no other organs. Given its
historical context of being established right after WWII, strategically limiting the jurisdiction to
act on humanitarian crises and/or to maintain international peace and security to only the UNSC
and giving the P-5 members permanent membership and veto power139 may have made sense
then. But, as analyzed in Chapter 3, from as early as the Cold War, this backfired and was a
terrible design flaw which was and still remains very problematic over time to today. For
instance, a recent example of a P-5 veto that prevented humanitarian intervention was the
ongoing Syrian War which began in 2011.140
Other than through the UNSC, the UN could also attain jurisdiction by either consent or
treaty basis. Consent based jurisdiction occurs when the state which is experiencing a conflict
can either request for help from the UN and/or grant jurisdiction to the UN, when requested. This
consent type of jurisdiction usually occurs when a state is being attacked or dominated
involuntarily by another state or an armed group or a climate crisis. The failure of the United
Nations Operation in Somalia from 1992 through 1995 is a good example of this. Since
Somalia's central government collapsed, the UN was not able to obtain consent for operations
UN. “Charter of the United Nations,” Chapter I: Purpose and Principles, accessed and verified on November 29,
2020, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/.
138
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from the warring parties. As a result, the UN could not deploy troops, as well as monitor the
cease-fire to the civil war, and there were more than 140 UN fatalities141 from hostile acts. The
mission ended in March 1995, failing to fulfill the mandate. This conflict persisted until 2009.
On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 3, treaty-based jurisdiction only occurs when a
state is a party to the convention or a treaty. When the state fails to meet its obligations arising
from treaties and/or violates them, it is often referred to and/or contested in the ICJ or ICC.
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, treaty-based jurisdiction is not very reliable only because all
states are not obligated to sign and ratify all treaties. To illustrate this, some of the human rights
treaties which the US has not signed and/or ratified on to are the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. As
Marie Wilken said, in her contribution to Global Justice Center Blog, “refusing to ratify human
rights treaties … deprives American citizens of protections they deserve.”142 Reiterating what
Wilken said, when a state refuses to ratify human rights treaties, its citizens are deprived of such
human rights. As a result, not every state can be held liable and kept to the same standard, even if
they violate their citizens’ human rights.
Especially in the cases of war and humanitarian crisis, the UN’s limited jurisdiction in
states’ affairs becomes very problematic. Unable to intervene without the UNSC’s controversial
discretionary approval, the UN is often held back while fully aware of atrocities and violations of
human rights taking place throughout the world. As of 2020, some of the ongoing humanitarian
crises are actively taking place in Afghanistan, Western Sudan (Darfur), Syria, Ukraine, Yemen,
China, and Myanmar.
Gloria Lotha, “UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia,” ed. Lorraine Murray, Encyclopaedia
Britannica, August 14, 2014, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/UNOSOM.
142
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III.

Design Flaw #2: Hierarchy of World Power
The second design flaw I was able to locate within the UN’s institutional design was the

uneven membership and power among states in the UN, based on international hierarchy of
powers, and lack of liability measure against the superpowers.
Uneven Membership and Power
While the UNGA’s “one state, one vote” policy may give the false impression that every
state gets an equal say, the system never had an equal membership from the start. Tracing the
UN’s history from 1945, when it was first designed and built, it was already too reliant on certain
powerful states, especially the U.S., for help, organization, funds, and military capabilities for
multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Realistically, the U.S.’ support in organizing
this initiative was most likely critical and was one of the reasons why this was even possible in
the first place. However, this dependence allowed the U.S. to shape the UN to be developed
more, if not only, compatible with the power and preferences of the U.S., and similar liberal
western countries. This is also a problem of legitimacy. To be considered legitimate, the
international regime cannot be seen as a particular dominant state’s work nor be controlled by
the preferences of a dominant state.
Another example of uneven membership and power exists in the permanent membership
and power of veto within the UNSC. As discussed in Chapter 3, after WWII, based on the
‘power,’ measured by combined means of economic, military, technological and cultural strength
as well as diplomatic and soft power influence, five superpowers were selected and granted
permanent membership—China (formerly, Republic of China), France, Russia (formerly,
USSR), the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as “P-5”). Veto power is
an exclusive power of the five permanent members to reject any substantive resolution proposed
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by the UNSC, and not "procedural" votes. The issue with the veto power is that, according to the
Security Council Report, Permanent members use the veto “to defend their national interests, to
uphold a tenet of their foreign policy or, in some cases, to promote a single issue of particular
importance to a state.”143 In essence, not only were the superpowers given a major loophole in
which they can use to protect themselves from UNSC and any potential international liabilities
by simply applying a veto, but also it allowed for the dominance of the principle of sovereignty
and hierarchy of powers to continue within the UN’s system.
Lack of Liability Measure Against Superpowers
Sometimes, the superpowers do what they want without facing any liability and
consequences. In particular, this was caused by the path dependent effects of design flaws, which
was set from origin and never fixed. The UN does not have any liability measures against
Superpowers. Although, in response, there are cases where other superpowers issue sanctions as
a preventive effort or to punish them, but based on many cases observed so far, it is not enough.
There needs to be a higher force or system above the superpowers to keep them in check and
balance. As of 2020, there are no such effective liability measures against superpowers.
From 1946 to present, on multiple occasions superpowers have taken actions that clearly
went against the established norm and rules of the UN. Yet, because of these superpower’s
position and power, the UN cannot keep them accountable. For instance, during the Cold War, it
was the French and the U.S. wars in Vietnam and the Soviet and Warsaw Pact’s invasion of
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Since they were all neither granted actions by the UNSC to
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maintain to restore international peace144 nor was it done in self-defense145, in terms of the
legality of these superpower’s actions, they are all violations of international law. Yet, none of
these conflicts were brought up in the UN, nor were superpowers held liable for their actions.
From 1947 through 1991, also known as the Cold War, the veto became especially a
problem and, over time, was never challenged. For instance, according to Security Council
Report, Soviet Union frequently blocked action of many peace and security issues and blocked
Western supported new members146 By the 1970s, the United States has used its veto more than
any other permanent member on the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and in defense of Israel.147
In a more recent case, another problematic instance was the handling of the ongoing civil war in
Syria and the worsening humanitarian crisis that started 2011.148 Both Russia and China
exercised their vetoes delaying actions that could have prevented the deaths of over 500,000
civilians and the millions displaced in Syria.149
Another example with a recent case was the 2014 Crimean crisis. Six years ago, the
Crimean Peninsula, which belongs to Ukraine, was illegally annexed by Russia. Russia sought to
justify its actions as an act of self-determination, as President Putin said, it was “to ensure proper
conditions for the people of Crimea to be able to freely express their will.”150 However,
according to Steven Pifer, it was a clear violation of “Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter prohibits war except to maintain or to restore international peace
(Article 42)
145
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter prohibits war except in self-defense (Article 51)
146
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integrity, and independence that Russia made in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security
Assurances for Ukraine and 1997 Ukrainian-Russian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Partnership.”151 In response, although the UNGA approved a resolution in 2014, “affirming
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and calling the referendum that led to Russia’s annexation of its
Crimean Peninsula illegal,” unlike in the UNSC, resolutions in the UNGA are not legally
binding. The UNSC also can and did not do anything because Russia is a member of P-5 and it
can easily use its veto power to strike down any enforcement measures against them. Still, many
countries condemned Russia for its actions, and regardless, this intervention and the illegal
annexation continues today.
IV.

Design Flaw #3: Competition
The third design flaw I was able to locate within the UN’s institutional design was that it

still operates in a neo-realist way, where states try to operate according to the principle of
sovereignty and competition for world power. This is a baked-in flaw because over time, states
begin to develop behaviors of prioritizing their national interests over collective international
interests. Starting from the Cold War, to the American Unipolarity, and even now in the
multipolar system, the P-5 members unfair power of veto and the volatility of state’s selective
interest played and continue to play a key role in how and which humanitarian crises are
addressed and takes priority.

Steven Pifer, “Five Years after Crimea's Illegal Annexation, the Issue Is No Closer to Resolution,” Brookings
Institution, March 18, 2019, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/18/five-years-after-crimeas-illegal-annexation-the-issueis-no-closer-to-resolution/.
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Use of Veto & Trend & Superpowers.
As the world was experiencing bipolarity, as a result of the Cold War between the two
superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, so was the UNSC unstable. This instability within the
UNSC reduced the UN’s ability to maintain international peace and security.
In the history of vetoes that were used by the P-5 members, perhaps the first nineteen
years were the worst and very one sided. From 1946 through 1965, according to the Global
Policy Forum, 114 vetoes were applied, of which 106 came from USSR, 4 from France, 3 from
the UK, and 1 from China.152 According to the Security Council report, a considerable amount of
these USSR votes were used to block action of many peace and security issues and blocked
Western supported new members.153
However, the trend changed from 1966 through 1995, when the U.S. started to apply their
vetoes. From 1966 through 1995, the U.S. by itself applied around 80 out of 140 vetoes, while
the U.K. applied 29; Russia applied 15; France applied 14; and China only applied 2. It was way
more veto than any other member of the P-5. According to the Security Council report, it was
mostly used on Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and in defense of Israel.154 After the USSR
collapsed in 1991 and the American Unipolarity began, the Security Council’s use of Chapter
VII, including its provisions for economic sanctions and military enforcement action, has
increased dramatically, and most peacekeeping operations now carry Chapter VII authority.
From 1996 through 2019, there was a different trend. Although the trend where the U.S.
was still the member with the most amount of veto continued, some superpowers began to
change their behaviors. For instance, France started advocating for a voluntary restraint on the

Global Policy Forum, “Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council,” 2009, accessed and
verified on November 29, 2020, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/32810.html.
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Security Council Report, “UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto,” op. cit.
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veto on the part of the permanent members. In 2013, France even hosted to an event with Mexico
in the UNGA and called for P-5 members to “voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use the
veto in case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a large scale.”155 In
response, only the UK has supported the initiative and not others. Around 2011, Russia and
China began to increase their use of their veto—unlike the previous years—for the conflict in
Syria. For example, from 2011 to 2019, Russia exercised 14 vetoes156 and China exercised 8
vetoes157 which delayed actions that could have prevented the deaths of over 500,000 civilians
and the massive displacement of half of the country in Syria.158 According to Rebecca Barber,
the vetoed resolutions “would have demanded that parties to the conflict comply with
international law, including by putting an end to indiscriminate aerial bombing, minimizing harm
to civilians, and not targeting medical and humanitarian personnel,” and “renewed the mandate
of an investigative mechanism for chemical weapons use, banned military flights in certain areas
to prevent aerial bombing, referred crimes to the International Criminal Court, and imposed
sanctions.”159 The Security Council’s continued failure to agree on any meaningful action to
protect civilians in Syria because of conflict of interests between superpowers and their
interference via the application of veto is a perfect example of how few state's selective interests,
in this case the superpowers’, can not only override the majority’s desires, but also decide how
and which humanitarian crises are addressed.

Ibid.
Security Council Report, “UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto,” op cit.
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Scott Lucas and Chris Doucouliagos, “How Russia's UN Vetoes Have Enabled Mass Murder in Syria,”op cit.
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Rebecca Barber, “Syria: the Disgraceful Stain Left by the UN Security Council Veto,” The Interpreter,
September 24, 2019, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/syria-disgraceful-stain-left-un-security-council-veto.
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State’s Selective Interest
In Chapter 2, I identified States as a Key Actor and their Role. After observing the states’
actions and behaviors, I realized that oftentimes they are driven by their selective national
interests and their behaviors can be volatile. States have either attempted to join or joined
specific UN bodies to gain a say and/or influence over world matters and international norms.
This was apparent in the case of certain human rights bodies, such as the UNCHR and Human
Rights Council, and especially the UNSC. In the UN’s history of enforcement of bringing peace
and protection of human rights, there are also cases where states’ selective interest, driven by
either competition or for its national interests, has either delayed or prevented an action by the
UN.
This can be best illustrated with why the UN Commission on Human Rights (“UNCHR”)
had to be terminated and replaced with the UN Human Rights Council (A new instrument
established in 2006) in the first place. According to the UN’s December 2004 report, the
UNCHR’s purpose was to “assess current threats to international peace and security; to evaluate
how our existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to make
recommendations for strengthening the United Nations so that it can provide collective security
for all in the twenty-first century.”160
Members of the Commission on Human Rights were elected by ECOSOC. The election
elected approximately a third of the members of the Commission. The members served for
three-year periods and were eligible to be re-elected. The 53 seats of the Commission were

UN, 2 GA Rep 59/565, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change addressed the
Secretary-General, 2 Dec 2004, para 3.
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C9B1B6D819968E83C1256F5E00597208/$file/Report+of
+the+High-level+Panel+on+Threats+Challenges+and+Change.pdf.
160

Lee 75

distributed as follows: 15 African States; 12 Asian States; 5 Eastern European States; 11 Latin
American & Caribbean States; and 10 Western Europe & Other States.161
Previously, even before the High-level panel’s 2004 report, the UNCHR’s legitimacy was
criticized by many UN members, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and human rights
advocates and activists, especially how it accepted and managed its members. Specifically,
several States, among its members, had extensive records of human rights violations — to list a
couple, People's Republic of China, Zimbabwe, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan (collectively,
“Violators”).162 Moreover, Libya's Chairmanship in 2003,163 and when Sudan was elected to join
the commission in 2004, in light of its ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region, set off a major alarm
for the UN and its bodies.164
Nazila Ghanea, Associate Professor of International Human Rights Law at the University
of Oxford, notes that these Violators joined the UNCHR to strategically block or lessen the
criticisms for their respective governments and atrocious human rights records.165 In other words,
these Violators sought membership not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves
against criticism or to criticize others; counteractive to the work that commission was mandated
to do. The High-level Panel confirmed and criticized the UNCHR for its membership process,
how it became a source of international tension, and how it has left a negative impact on the
work of the Commission.166
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By the same token, with corrupted membership, UNCHR commonly provoked backlash
for its selectivity addressing the human rights concerns. For example, despite the United States’
effort in addressing Sudan’s ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region on April 2004,167 Sudan’s
membership to the commission was uncontested in May 2004. With the commission’s
unwillingness and failure to do anything, Sudan’s ethnic cleansing was instead addressed by the
United Nations Security Council on July 30, 2004,168 see UNSCR Res 1556.169 Highlighting the
selectivity issue, Professor Ghanea notes that by utilizing political favor the Violators make sure
that any resolution would be less condemnatory in tone, making sure it was adopted through a
vote and not by consensus, or even by misusing the 'no-action motion' to block discussion of
their human rights situation.170 In other words, Violators would use their seat to dilute any human
rights resolution against themselves and evade the commission’s mandate to promote, protect,
and advance human rights.
V.

Design Flaw #4: Slow Adaptation to Change
The fourth design flaw is a collective set of design flaws all themed under the concept of

‘slow adaptation to change.’ Throughout time, there are patterns of established countries
breaking up and new countries being founded, as well as countries changing their forms of
governance (Monarchy, Communist, Republic, Military Dictatorship, etc). As a result, state laws
and policies change. Sometimes they do not comply with established understanding, rules, and
ideologies, especially, when it comes to international laws, UN efforts, and human rights.

U.S. Department of State. “Sudan: Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur.” U.S. Department of State, April 27, 2004.
https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/31822.htm.
168
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Council’s order.
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Thereby, sometimes there are cases of minorities being excluded, deprived of human rights, and
suffering. Documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and such conventions
calling for protection of human rights are currently not enough to protect these most vulnerable
people and their human rights. In terms of institutional design, this design flaw highlights how
the UN lacks in measurement against these critical and problematic changes that happen within
or to the state, such as when there are cases of breakdown and emergence of new States; or when
a state’s form of government changes; and/or when a state creates a new inclusion or exclusion
policy.
Breakdown and Emergence of New States.
Breakdown and emergence of new states occurs for various reasons. From 1945 to
present, there were multiple cases of states splitting. For example, to list a couple, in 1945, North
and South Koreas were created after Japan surrendered to the Allies; in 1947, India and Pakistan
was created as a result of Partition of India; in 1971, Bangladesh emerged out of Pakistan as a
result of Indo-Pakistani War of 1971; and in 1993, Czechoslovakia split into Czech Republic and
Slovakia as a result of self-determined split.
Although there are cases of self-determined splits like Czechoslovakia in 1993, the
effects of breakdown and emergence of new states are often catastrophic. Oftentimes, many
people end up displaced and/or become refugees and stateless because residents cannot secure
citizenship under the restrictive and sometimes discriminatory laws of the new states, or if the
successor states lack the administrative capacity to register their residents or do not afford them
sufficient time to register. For instance, according to Sajal Nag, the partition of India created 15
million refugees and five million Koreans were displaced as a result of the Korean war.171
Sajal Nag, "Nationhood and Displacement in Indian Subcontinent," Economic and Political Weekly 36, no. 51
(2001): 4753-760, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4411510.
171
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Currently, the UN does not have any effective measure to deal with breakdown and
emergence of new states nor effective jurisdiction to intervene. As a result, many are excluded,
deprived of human rights, and suffering.
Figure 10: Forms of Government, 2018

(National Geographic Society, “Forms of Government, 2018,” August 20, 2020, Retrieved from National
Geographic, at:
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/maps/forms-government-2018/#:~:text=Some%20of%20the%20different%20ty
pes,an%20oligarchy%2C%20and%20an%20autocracy.)

Changes in Form of Government
According to Figure 10, as of 2018, the types of government around the world can be
categorized with the following eight types: Absolute Monarchy, Communist, Constitutional
Monarchy, Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy, Parliamentary Republic, Presidential
Republic, Semi-Presidential Republic, and No Functioning Central Government. Throughout
history, many countries have changed their forms of government. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
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form of government plays a critical role when determining how the country is ruled and human
rights are either protected or limited.
Currently, the UN does not have any effective measure to deal with changes in form of
Government nor effective jurisdiction to intervene when it occurs. As a result, many are
excluded, deprived of human rights, and suffering.
New Inclusion vs. Exclusion Policies
As discussed in Chapter 2, although it varies state by state, citizenship or having a
nationality usually plays a critical role in determining a person’s level of protected human rights.
Meanwhile, again it varies state by state, when a person does not have a nationality or are
‘stateless,’ their human rights are usually not guaranteed and to some extent non-existent. So, in
this context, states and their policies are very important because they are the primary actors who
have the power to create policies and laws that are either inclusive or exclusive. Inclusive
policies are not the problem, it is the exclusion policies which are the main problem. Exclusion
policies can take multiple forms, such as persecutions and removal of rights based on religion,
social, racial, national and/or political factors, and as far as, revoking nationality.
Currently, Rohingyas in and out of Myanmar, Muslims in India, and Uighurs in China are
experiencing such exclusionary policies. The UN does not have any effective measure to protect
these vulnerable people.
VI.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed the following four Design Flaws: ‘jurisdiction’, ‘hierarchy of

the world power,’ ‘competition,’ and ‘change;’ and how each of these flaws allowed for the
Westphalian Sovereignty and hierarchy of world power to co-exist. I also discussed how these
Design Flaws were left unresolved over time and consequently, the UN was path dependent to
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fail from the beginning. In the following Chapter, the ongoing Rohingya Muslim Crisis will be
analyzed as a case study and the following topics will be covered: How Rohingyas became
stateless; crises in 1991, 2012, and 2016; 2017 Genocide; post genocide crisis management;
analyses of the crises and the genocide with the application of the Design Flaws.
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CHAPTER 5 – CASE STUDY: ROHINGYA MUSLIMS CRISIS
I.

Introduction
In this chapter, I am going to first delve into the UN’s procedures of maintaining

international peace and security and protecting and promoting human rights, and explore the
Rohingya Muslim Crisis, and the 2017 Genocide, to closely study why the UN wasn’t there to
protect these stateless peoples’ human rights, and to stop the genocide from taking place. Upon
examining all of the UN's human rights mechanisms and institutions, the only one that has the
independent enforcement authority is the Security Council (“UNSC”). I have found this to be the
case because in the history of the UN, from its origin to present, by design, the Charter only
authorized the UNSC with the jurisdiction, authority, and power to intervene in state’s domestic
affairs; and no other IGOs within the UN. To this date (2020), only the UNSC has such
jurisdiction, authority, and power. Therefore, in this case study, to address this thesis’
puzzle—Why the UN could not protect the Rohingya’s human rights — the UNSC and its
actions will be closely observed and traced.
In response to interstate and intrastate humanitarian conflicts and crises that threaten
international peace and security, according to the UNSC, the standard tactics and tools it has
been employing for years are: using preventive diplomacy and mediation, imposing sanctions,
sending peacekeeping forces, assisting with peacebuilding, countering terrorism, and
encouraging disarmament.172 Among them, as political scientist and peace researcher Ramesh
Thakur writes, “one of the most visible symbols of the UN role in international peace and
security” is the peacekeeping operation.173 In fact, in multiple cases from as early as 1956,
peacekeeping operations have shown to be effective in containing fights or stabilizing a
UN, “Maintain International Peace and Security,” op cit.
Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the
Responsibility to Protect, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, doi:10.1017/9781316819104.
172
173
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cease-fire until negotiations produced lasting peace agreements in interstate conflicts. In 1988,
the UN was even awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize for its successful peacekeeping activities.
This has led to expansion of tasks for peacekeepers and many new missions involving complex
intrastate conflicts and multidimensional peacekeeping— “operations comprising a mix of
military, police, and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable
peace.”174 Today, the UN’s multidimensional peacekeeping operations are not only used to
maintain peace and security, but also “to facilitate political processes, protect civilians, assist in
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support constitutional
processes and the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights175 and assist in
restoring the rule of law and extending legitimate state authority,” according to the UN.176
In the post-Cold War era, UN peacekeeping operations have been and still are crucial,
especially in protecting and promoting human rights, in the following humanitarian crises: Iraq
War (1991); Bosnian War and Genocide (1992-1995); Somali Civil War (1992-1993); Rwandan
Genocide (1994); Crisis in Burundi (1995-1996); ongoing Crisis in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC) (1998-Present); Kosovo War and Ethnic Cleansing (1999); ongoing Darfur
Genocide (2003-Present); and ongoing Syrian Civil War and Crisis (2011-present). As of 2020,
there are 13 UN peacekeeping operations currently deployed and there have been a total of 58
past operations since 1956.177 Protecting the Rohingya would have been consistent with these
previous actions and within UNSC jurisdiction. So, why, then, did the UNSC not act?

UN, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (‘the Capstone Doctrine’),” 2008,
accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/united-nations-peacekeeping-operations-principles-and-guidelines-the
-capstone-doctrine/.
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Still, much of the UN’s involvement in other states’ affairs and the peacekeeping
operations’ major development and expansion of tasks to include protection and promotion of
human rights are

under Security Council’s discretion and its power to determine which

humanitarian crises would qualify as threats to international peace and security under Chapter
VII. In simpler terms, which crises gets the UN’s attention and/or intervention depends on the
political will in the Security Council, and even more precisely on the interest of the P-5
superpowers. This was evident during the Cold War, where many important issues of peace and
security, such as the Vietnam conflict178, either never made it on the UN agenda or addressed
because of the threat of veto power.179 This chapter also asks if this was also the case for the
Rohingyas crisis and Genocide.
History tells us the Rohingyas sought help and international protection from their
persecutor, the government of Myanmar, on numerous occasions as early as 1991. Fast
forwarding to 2017, when acts of genocide and crimes against humanity were committed, why
didn’t the UN, or more specifically the Security Council, take any action to prevent further
damage? I will argue that the UN did not take any action because of the path dependent effects of
the following institutional Design Flaws: Slow Adaptation to Change; Hierarchy of World
Power; Competition; and Jurisdiction. This chapter demonstrates this with the following six
sections. The first section explains how the Rohingya people became stateless and their life after
becoming stateless. The second section provides the history and key moments of the Rohingya
Muslim Crisis, as well as, traces what the UNSC did from 1990 to present. The third section
178

To clarify, according to Lobel, although the Vietnam conflict was on UNSC’s agenda, after the U.S.’ insisted,
“no action has ever been taken by the Security Council to restore peace in Vietnam.” See more at William N. Lobel,
“The Legality of the United States' Involvement in Vietnam - A Pragmatic Approach,” University of Miami Law
Review 74, no. 4 (1969): 792-813, https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol23/iss4/7
179
In the case of the Vietnam conflict, an argument can be that the UNSC failed to act because the U.S., a
veto-power holder, was involved. To clarify, a claim can be made that the UNSC was immobile because the
possibility of the U.S. easily blocking any of the UNSC’s potential action with a veto was there.
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explains the 2017 Genocide and covers post-genocide crisis management from 2017 to 2020.
Next, the fourth section examines two critical junctures -- moments in history when the UNSC
had the chance to intervene, but did not because of the Design Flaws: Time 1, the moment when
Burma’s regime changed to military rule in 1962, set Myanmar on a limited path to Time 2, the
moment when Myanmar’s military regime appeared to change to one led by the civilian National
League for Democracy political party in 2015, though with limited choices for the NLD. Lastly,
the last section concludes the chapter.
II.

Becoming Stateless & Life After
The Rohingyas were not always stateless. Up until 1974, the Republic of Burma

recognized the Rohingyas as Burmese citizens. In 1948, Burma became independent from the
British in January, and joined the United Nations in April. In the following year, the new
Parliament passed the Union Citizenship Act in 1948, which recognized all citizens as equal,
including the Rohingya and other minority groups. Post-independence, in 1949, Burma created
its first form of national identification and it was also issued to Rohingyas.180 From 1951 through
1960, Burma held three general elections. All citizens had the right to vote, including the
Rohingya. Voters even elected several Rohingyas as members of Parliament.
1962 Military Coup & Rule
In 1962, the Burmese military, led by General Ne Win, staged a coup with armed forces
overthrowing the elected government and establishing military rule without any blood. Given
that more than 40% of people living in Myanmar181 were made up by different minority

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Burma's Path to Genocide Timeline,” 2020, accessed and verified
on November 29, 2020, https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/burmas-path-to-genocide/timeline.
181
BBC News, “Who Are Burma's Minority Groups?,” November 18, 2010, accessed and verified on November 29,
2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11620652.
180
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groups,182 and the military was primarily led and made up by Burmese descendants, who make
up the other 60% of Myanmar’s population, among many possible reasons why the military
staged a coup, I theorize that the pre-existing ethnic conflict183 and Burmese national identity
played a big role. In particular, this theory becomes more apparent as the military regime
legitimizes itself and crafts new strategic restrictive measures in a pattern of every 4 years
between 1974 and 1982.
Shortly after, in 1974, to legitimize its position and power, and to create a more militaryfavored system, Burma’s military-run government enacted a new constitution, which established
one-party rule, overrun with military members. After legitimizing its power and taking full
control of the government, in the same year, the military’s Parliament passed the Emergency
Immigration Act. In effect, this law limited the rights of individuals the military saw as
“foreigners” from Bangladesh, China, and India, including the Rohingya. Burmese authorities
begin confiscating Rohingyas’ national registration cards.
In 1978, Burmese authorities launched Operation Naga-Min, or “Dragon King,” to
register and verify the status of citizens and people viewed as “foreigners.” Soldiers assaulted
and terrorized Rohingya. Four years after, in 1982, the Parliament passed a new law, which
based citizenship on ethnicity. The new law excluded the Rohingya and other minority
communities and stripped their Burmese citizenship, which rendered them stateless. In 1989,
Burma changed its name to Myanmar and the government required everyone to apply for new
identification cards, called Citizenship Scrutiny Cards. Rohingya never received the new cards.

Myanmar's list of minority groups are composed of Rakhine, Karen, Mon, Shan, Muslim Rohingya, Wa, Chin,
Kachin, and Karenni people.
183
Based on Myanmar's history, the internal ethnic conflict between the Burmese descendants and other minorities
can be traced as far as when it was colonized by the U.K. in both the 19th and 20th centuries.
182
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Figure 11: Chronology 1990 - 2005
27 May 1990

The NLD won in the first multiparty election since a military coup toppled the government in
1962. The military refuses to recognize the results and remains in power.

1991

Military launched Operation Pyi Thaya (Clean and Beautiful Nation) during which soldiers
committed widespread violence. Roughly 250,000 Rohingya flee to Bangladesh.

17 December 1991

The General Assembly passed resolution 46/132, deploring the fact that the Government of
Myanmar had not fulfilled commitments to taking steps toward the establishment of a
democracy and expressed concern at the seriousness of the human rights situation in the
country.

3 March 1992

The Commission on Human Rights, in resolution 1992/58, established a Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Myanmar. Yozo Yokota of Japan was named to the post.

January 1993

The government started a national constitutional convention.

1995

NLD members walked out of the national constitutional convention because of restrictions on
debate.

10 July 1995

Suu Kyi released from house arrest.

1996

Rajsoomer Lallah of Mauritius became the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights
situation in Myanmar, succeeding Yozo Yokota.

1996

A national constitution convention closed without drafting a new constitution.

1997

The Secretary-General appointed Alvaro de Soto of Peru as his Special Envoy to Myanmar.

1997

The ruling party, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), changed name to the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)

April 2000

The Secretary-General appointed Razali Ismail of Malaysia as his Special Envoy for Myanmar,
replacing Alvaro de Soto.

August 2000

Suu Kyi and a convoy of NLD members faced off with police. UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan called on the government to engage in political dialogue with the NLD.

September 2000

Suu Kyi was again placed under house arrest.

December 2000

Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro of Brazil became the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in
Myanmar, succeeding Rajsoomer Lallah.

May 2002

Suu Kyi was released from house arrest.

30 May 2003

Suu Kyi and a convoy of supporters were attacked by a militia outside Mandalay. Suu Kyi was
arrested shortly after.

30 August 2003

The ruling party, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), announced the road map
to democracy. Gen. Khin Nyunt succeeded Than Shwe as prime minister. Shwe remained head
of the SPCD.

17 May 2004

National constitutional convention reconvened.

17 February 2005

The National Convention reconvened, without the involvement of the NLD.
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June 2005
6 July 2005

The US raised concerns about Myanmar at the Security Council’s closed consultations under
“other matters.”
The Government of Myanmar released 249 political prisoners.

3 December 2005

The Security Council decided to hold a closed-door briefing on the situation in Myanmar.

Source: Historical Chronology: Update Report No. 4: Myanmar (2005). Accessed and verified November 11, 2020.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_1304015.php

III.

Rohingya Muslim Crisis (1990 - Present)

1990 The National League For Democracy & Military
In 1990, with Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Gen. Aung San, as the party’s leader,
the National League for Democracy (NLD) Party won Burma's national elections. However, the
military refused to recognize the results and remained in power. This stirred political unrest
throughout Burma.
1st Rohingya Muslim Crisis (1991)
In 1991, as citizens continued to call for democratic reforms, Myanmar’s military
launched a new campaign against the Rohingya to create a political diversion— Operation Pyi
Thaya or “Clean and Beautiful Nation.” Burmese soldiers turned to Rohingyas and violently
executed, raped, and assaulted them. They also destroyed their homes and property and even
subjected them with forced labor, and religious persecution.
Between 1991 and 1992, more than 250,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.184 With the
assistance of UNHCR and non-governmental relief agencies, according to the Human Rights
Watch report, “the Bangladeshi government sheltered the refugees in nineteen camps in the
vicinity of Cox's Bazar in southeastern Bangladesh.”185 In December 17 1991, The General
Assembly passed resolution 46/132, deploring the fact that the Government of Myanmar had not
Security Council Report, “Chronology of Events: Myanmar,” October 6, 2020, accessed and verified on
November 29, 2020. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/myanmar.php.
185
Human Rights Watch, “Burmese Refugees In Bangladesh: Still No Durable Solution,” May 2000, accessed and
verified on November 29, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-01.htm.
184
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fulfilled commitments to taking steps toward the establishment of a democracy and expressed
concern at the seriousness of the human rights situation in the country.186 Neither able to
integrate the Rohingyas nor to keep hosting them, the Bangladeshi government intended to send
all the refugees home quickly and sought to achieve this through negotiation with the ruling State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in Rangoon.187 By 1992, roughly 150,000
Rohingya in Bangladesh repatriated back to Burma whether they wanted to or not.188 In January
1993, the Myanmar government started a national constitutional convention. In 1994, the
government started to deny Rohingya children birth certificates. In the following year, 1995, the
government issued Rohingya a new form of identification, known as a temporary registration
card or “white card.” However, it does not serve as proof of citizenship. In 1995, National
League for Democracy members walked out of the national constitutional convention because of
restrictions on debate.
In June 2005, the US, one of the superpowers, took an interest and raised concerns about
Myanmar at the Security Council’s closed consultations under “other matters,” on the grounds
that the situation there, with its refugee flows and drug trade, constituted a threat to international
peace and security.189 On September 20, Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu commissioned a
Report finding that Burma fit the criteria for United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
intervention. The Report called on UNSC members to pass a resolution requiring the regime to
work with the UN in restoring democracy to Burma, and to release Aung San Suu Kyi and all
prisoners of conscience. Shortly after, by the beginning of December 2005, ten members of the
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Council were willing to place Myanmar on the agenda of the Council. However, Algeria, Brazil,
China, Japan and Russia were opposed. So, on December 3, 2005, in informal consultations, a
decision was made by consensus that the Council would receive a briefing on Myanmar from a
senior Secretariat official under “other matters” item during informal consultations. The
alternative was a formal meeting which would have resulted in a vote to approve an agenda item.
With ten votes in favour and no veto on procedural issues, the decision would have been positive
but at the same time, it would have shown the split in the Council. Acting by consensus at this
stage and time was perhaps thought to have greater impact. On December 16, 2005, the Security
Council held its first ever briefing on the situation in Myanmar, the UNSC had it in its authority
to intervene, but it didn't.
Figure 12: Chronology 2005 - 2012 (Next Page)
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2006

On 29 September and 27 November the Council was briefed on Myanmar by
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari who covered the deteriorating
humanitarian situation in Myanmar, the human rights and refugee problem in the Karen state
and progress towards an inclusive and democratic political process.

June 2007

The International Committee of the Red Cross publicly censured Myanmar’s government
accusing it of committing serious abuses against detainees and civilians.

September 2007

The government had completed the first stage of its “roadmap to democracy” producing
guidelines for a new constitution. Observers noted that a constitution based on these guidelines
would legitimise military rule. On 26 September, the Security Council held an emergency
meeting and it supported the Secretary-General’s decision to send the Special Adviser to the
region.

October 2007

On 11 October, the Council adopted its first presidential statement on Myanmar deploring the
use of violence against demonstrations and emphasising the importance of early release of
prisoners.

November 2007

The Special Adviser briefed the Council on 13 November regarding his mission to Myanmar
and in response, the Council issued a press statement which deplored “that many prisoners are
still in jail and new arrests have occurred”; stressed the need for the Myanmar government “to
create conditions for dialogue and reconciliation by relaxing as a first step, the conditions of
detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and release of political prisoners and detainees”; and
confirmed that the Council would “keep developments in Myanmar under close review.”

May 2008

On 7 May, France asked the Council to consider using “responsibility to protect” as the basis
for Council action to get aid into Myanmar. This proposal was met with considerable
resistance by China, Indonesia, and South Africa.190

2008-2009

As political unrest under the military government has been getting worse, the Special Envoy
on Myanmar made reports and briefed the Council on his visits to Myanmar regarding military
government’s unlawful arrests, political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.

July 2009

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Myanmar and met with senior officials but his request
to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi was denied. ASEAN reiterated its call on the Myanmar
government to immediately release all those under detention including Aung San Suu Kyi so
that they can participate in the 2010 elections.

August 2009

On 11 August the Council held consultations to discuss the situation in Myanmar and the
implications of Aung San Suu Kyi being sentenced to a further 18 months of house arrest.On
13 August the Council issued a press statement reiterating the importance of the release of all
political prisoners. In that context the Council expressed serious concern at the conviction and
sentencing of Aung San Suu Kyi.

2010

In March, November, and December, the Council members were briefed by the Special
Advisor on the situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, and the publication of the five new
electoral laws. The military-backed political party wins Burma’s first national elections held
since 1968. It appoints General Thein Sein as president. The opposition party, National League
for Democracy, boycotts.

April 2012

Burma holds local elections in some areas. Council members were briefed in informal
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consultations by the Special Adviser that Aung San Suu Kyi’s area elected her as their member
of Parliament.
June 2012

Clashes between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine State erupt into
state-supported violence against the Rohingya. On June 20, the Council members were
updated on the recent troubles in the western Rakhine State, where the communal violence
between the ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims has led to a humanitarian crisis.
Source: Chronology of Events in Myanmar. Accessed and verified November 11, 2020.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/myanmar.php

2nd Rohingya Muslim Crisis (2012)
Domestically, as Myanmar citizens grew discontented with the military’s rule, political
unrest increased in 2006. To suppress and exert control over its civilians, the Myanmar
government unlawfully detained and imprisoned anyone who dared to oppose the military.
Internationally, more than the deteriorating humanitarian crisis and the refugee problem
involving the Rohingyas, the Security Council was more interested in Myanmar’s political
prisoners, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, and the non-existent democratic political process under the
military rule from 2000 through 2012.
In 2012, between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine State there were
clashes, which immediately erupted into state-supported violence against the Rohingya. Shortly
after, some Buddhist citizens and monks established “The 969,” a Buddhist nationalist
movement, which included using anti-Rohingya hate speech that claimed Rohingyas do not
belong in Myanmar, are a threat, and intruders.191 This movement was later banned, as this
movement encouraged more unwanted violence against Muslims in the country. With the
escalating state supported persecution, from 2012 through 2014, tens of thousands of Rohingya
fled Burma by boat.192
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Figure 13: Chronology 2013-2017
April 2013

On 16 April, Vijay Nambiar, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for Myanmar, briefed
Council members in consultations and updated Council members on the situation on the ground
in Myanmar.

April 2014

Under “any other business” in informal consultations, at the request of the UK on 17 April, the
briefing focused on the situation in Rakhine, in particular the recent rise in inter-communal
tensions there, the disruption of humanitarian aid and the controversy surrounding the national
census that was conducted for the first time in 30 years without Rohingya.

March 2015

The government invalidated Rohingya white cards, their only form of identification. Then, the
Rohingyas are required to obtain national verification cards. These cards incorrectly identify
Rohingya as immigrants from Bangladesh. Most Rohingyas reject the new cards.

April 2015

On 2 April, the Special Adviser on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar acknowledged recent positive
developments such as continuing progress in the reform process and the 31 March nationwide
ceasefire between ethnic armed groups and the government, but also noted continuing challenges
in Rakhine state, increasing violence in Kachin and Northern Shan states and concerns about the
human rights situation.

May 2015

On 28 May, the High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein briefed Council
members on the human rights situation in Myanmar, in particular on the Rohingya and the related
migration crisis in Southeast Asia.

August 2015

On 28 August, Special Adviser Vijay Nambiar an update was provided on progress towards
signing a national ceasefire agreement, as well as the situation with regard to minority groups in
Rakhine State, and preparations for elections later this year.

November 2015

On 19 November, the Special Advisor Vijay Nambiar briefed Council members on the 8
November elections in which the National League for Democracy, the party of Nobel Peace Prize
winner Aung San Suu Kyi, won by a landslide. Nambiar welcomed the peaceful and orderly
conduct of the elections but noted as a serious flaw the disenfranchisement of the Rohingya.

February 2016

On 4 February, the UK sent a letter to the Council president requesting the retention of the
situation in Myanmar on the list of items of which the Council is seized. On 25 February, the
Special Adviser Vijay Nambiar briefed Council members on the political transition, the peace
process and the human rights situation.

April 2016

Aung San Suu Kyi becomes State Counsellor, a new role created with authority over the
president. She is now the de facto head of the Burmese government. The NLD party takes control
of parliament.

September 2016

The Myanmar government appointed an Advisory Commission, led by former United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan, to look at the situation between Buddhists and the Rohingya in
Rakhine State. The following year (2017), the commission made 88 recommendations to improve
the situation.

October 2016

A small group of Rohingya men attack several Myanmar police posts in Rakhine State, and nine
officers are killed. In response, the Myanmar military launches a “clearance operation,” killing
people, raping women, and destroying Rohingya villages throughout northern Rakhine. The
violence forces roughly 86,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh.

November 2016

On 17 November, the Special Adviser Vijay Nambiar briefed Council members on the recent
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escalation of violence in Rakhine state and the humanitarian and human rights situation. While
emphasizing that lack of access made it difficult to assess the situation, Nambiar said there were
signs of more organized resistance by the Rohingya and a risk of further radicalization of the
conflict.
March 2017

The United Nations Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact Finding
Mission to investigate human rights abuses in Myanmar. The Myanmar government refuses to
cooperate. On 17 March, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed
Council members on the situation in Myanmar. The main focus of the briefing was the situation
in Rakhine, including the humanitarian challenges. Security Council Members expressed
concerns about human rights violations and the humanitarian situation and were interested in how
the UN could support the peace process.
Source: Chronology of Events in Myanmar. Accessed and verified on November 11, 2020.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/myanmar.php

After the June 2012 meeting, the Rohingya Muslim Crisis issue appeared even less on the
Security Council’s agenda. The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for Myanmar, Vijay
Nambiar made visits to Myanmar several times and updated Council members on the situation
on the ground in Myanmar, in informal consultations under “any other business” once a year.
Other than the annual informal debrief meetings, which was done so at the request of the UK, the
Security Council took no particular action to address the humanitarian crises and the Rohingya
refugee crisis in Myanmar from April 2013 through April 2015. In terms of reasons why the
UNSC took no particular action, one plausible reason why may be because this was when the
UN Syrian refugee crisis was being addressed by the UN and major superpowers like Russia and
China generally opposed any intervention in domestic affairs.
However, starting in April 2015 the Security Council, more specifically the United
Kingdom, took greater interest in the Rohingya Muslim Crisis. Although the meetings were still
being held in informal consultations under “any other business,” the Security Council convened
more frequently from 2015 through 2016.
End of Military Rule - Beacon of Hope?
In November 2015, Myanmar held national elections. Although the Rohingya did not
have the right to vote or run for political office, the National League for Democracy party led by
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Aung San Suu Kyi won in a landslide. Shortly after, in April 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi became
State Counsellor, a new role created with authority over the president. As the NLD party took
control of parliament and Suu Kyi became the de facto head of the Burmese government, there
was a regime change from the military rule to NLD party’s rule. In many respects, the end of
military rule and a new government led by Suu Kyi was viewed as an ideal outcome and a
beacon of hope domestically and internationally. Many believed in its potentials and possibilities
to change its current corrupt existing system. Still, it was plagued by the 2008 constitution,
which was designed to support and justify military rule. The constitution left the power to
command much of the government to the military, which made immediate reforms to their
political system unrealistic.193
In September 2016, the new NLD-led Myanmar government appointed an Advisory
Commission, led by former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, to look at the
situation between Buddhists and the Rohingya in Rakhine State. The following year (2017), the
commission made 88 recommendations to improve the situation.
3rd Rohingya Muslim Crisis (2016)
In October 2016, a small group of Rohingya men, later known as ARSA, attacked several
Burmese police posts using household knives, stones, and home-made explosives in Rakhine
State. Nine officers were killed as a result.194 The military retaliated with another widespread
campaign of violence of killing people, raping women, and destroying Rohingya villages
throughout northern Rakhine. Tens of thousands more Rohingya fled to neighboring countries

193

Andrew R.C. Marshall and Timothy Mclaughlin, “Myanmar's Suu Kyi Says [She] Will Be above [The] President
in New Government,” Thomson Reuters, November 5, 2015, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-election/myanmars-suu-kyi-says-will-be-above-president-in-new-gove
rnment-idUSKCN0SU0AR20151105.
194
Security Council Report, “Myanmar Chronology of Events,”op. cit.

Lee 95

for safety.195 Roughly 86,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.196 Security forces increased
restrictions again on those who stayed.
On November 17, 2016, under “any other business,” at the request of the US, the
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar, briefed Council members on
the recent escalation of violence in Rakhine state and the humanitarian and human rights
situation. According to the Security Council report, during the meeting, Nambiar said “there
were signs of more organised resistance by the Rohingya and a risk of further radicalisation of
the conflict.”197 Still, the Security Council took no particular action to address the humanitarian
crises and the Rohingya refugee crisis in Myanmar.
Four months later, in March 2017, to investigate human rights abuses in Myanmar, the
Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact Finding Mission. The
Myanmar government refused to cooperate. In the March 2017 meeting, UNSC members even
expressed concerns about human rights violations and the humanitarian situation and were
interested in how the UN could support the peace process.
Again, between Fall 2017 and Spring 2017, although the Security Council was aware of
the escalation of violence that was taking place in Rakhine state and the humanitarian and human
rights situation involving the Rohinyas in Myanmar, yet, no actions were taken by the Security
Council. The Security Council did not take any action, despite the activism of the SG's Special
Envoy.
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IV.

2017 Genocide and Its Aftermath
It all escalated on August 25, 2017, when a Rohingya rebel group known as ARSA

attacked several military posts in Rakhine. The attack on August 25, 2017, left 12 police officers
dead198 and sparked a brutal retaliation by the state security forces, unlike the crises in 1991 and
2012. Myanmar's military launched the largest and most violent disproportionate attack on
Rohingya civilians. In terms of death tolls and damages as a result of the violence, between
August 25 and September 24, 2017, 6,700 to 9,000 people are estimated to have been killed,
including 730 children under the age of 5 years old; girls and women were gang raped; families
were separated; and several hundred Rohingya villages were burnt down. As they were fleeing
persecution from Myanmar, no one came to their rescue. More than 700,000 Rohingyas are
estimated to have fled for their lives, seeking refuge in Bangladesh and other neighboring states,
such as Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Gambia, India, and the United States. By
March 2019, around 909,000 Rohingya refugees are estimated to be in the camps in Uhkya and
Teknaf Upazilas, Bangladesh.199
Figure 14: Chronology 2017 - 2020 (Next page)
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September 2017

On 13 September, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the
Council members on the deteriorating situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. On 26 September,
Council members were briefed again by Feltman under “any other business”. On 28 September,
the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General in a public meeting.

October 2017

On 13 October, at the initiative of France and the United Kingdom, an Arria-formula meeting
was held in Myanmar, focusing on the situation in Rakhine state. Former UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan briefed in his capacity as the Chair of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State,
which was comprised of both Myanmar and international commissioners and published a final
report on 23 August that included recommendations for improving the situation in the state with
regard to conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, reconciliation, institution-building and
development.

December 2017

On 12 December, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman and Special
Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten briefed the Council on
developments in Myanmar. Representatives from Bangladesh and Myanmar also participated in
the meeting. In the consultations that followed, besides Feltman and Patten, representatives from
OCHA, OHCHR, and UNHCR were present.

February 2018

On 13 February, at the request of eight members of the Council: Equatorial Guinea, France,
Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the US, the Council was briefed by High
Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi (via video teleconference) and Assistant
Secretary-General for Political Affairs Miroslav Jenča.

May 2018

On 14 May, the Council was briefed by Ambassador Mansour Al-Otaibi (Kuwait), Ambassador
Gustavo Meza-Cuadra Velásquez (Peru), and Ambassador Karen Pierce (UK), the three co-leads
on the Council’s visiting mission to Bangladesh and Myanmar from 28 April to 1 May.

August 2018

On 28 August, the Council was briefed by Secretary-General António Guterres, UNHCR
Goodwill Ambassador Cate Blanchett, and UNDP Associate Administrator Tegegnework Gettu
on the situation in Myanmar and the Rohingya refugee crisis.

February 2019

The Council was briefed on 28 February on the situation in Myanmar from Special Envoy
Christine Schraner Burgener, who visited the country at the end of January.

March 2019

Under “any other business” meeting on 20 March, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Pramila Patten provided Council members
with information on her meetings with Myanmar government officials and the follow-up to the
joint communiqué signed on 8 December 2018 between the UN and the government of Myanmar
to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual violence.

July 2019

During “any other business” meeting on 2 July, led by Special Envoy Christine Schraner
Burgener, members raised questions about the situation in Myanmar including likely tensions in
the run-up to the general elections in 2020, the Rohingya situation, and the continuing clashes
between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar government forces. The UN’s activities in Myanmar
were also discussed.

August 2019

On 21 August, Council members discussed the return of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar under
“any other business”. The meeting was requested by Belgium, France, Germany, the UK and the
US following the Myanmar government’s announcement that it had cleared 3,450 people for
repatriation on 22 August from a list of 22,000 provided by Bangladesh. On 23 August, there was
an Arria-formula meeting organized by Germany, Peru and Kuwait on “Mass Atrocity Crimes in
Myanmar: Where do we stand on accountability?”

November 2019

The Republic of The Gambia institutes proceedings against the Republic of the Union of
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Myanmar and asks the [International] Court [of Justice, ICJ] to indicate provisional measures
February 2020

On 4 February, Members referred to the Independent Commission of Enquiry final report that
had been submitted to the Myanmar government on 20 January. A number of Council members
urged Myanmar to comply with the provisional measures indicated by the ICJ and to address the
root causes of the conflicts in Myanmar. Members also referred to the need for Myanmar to
create conditions for and facilitate a voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the
Rohingya to Myanmar.

May 2020

On 14 May meeting, Special Envoy Christine Schraner Burgener covered recent developments in
Myanmar, including the democratic transition, the conflict in Rakhine state and Rohingya crisis
and highlighted the impact of COVID19 on these issues. She also addressed humanitarian access
issues and regional cooperation. Following the meeting, the past and present EU Council
members (Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, and Poland) held a virtual stakeout during which
they expressed their concern about the military escalation in Rakhine and Chin States and called
for an immediate, comprehensive and nationwide ceasefire.

September 2020

On 11 September, the meeting briefed on a range of issues including the need to de-escalate the
conflict, humanitarian access, the Panglong peace process, accountability, the Rakhine Advisory
Commission recommendations, the tripartite memorandum of understanding between the
Myanmar government, UNDP and UNHCR, and the upcoming November elections. While
members showed some unity over concerns about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the
need for conflict de-escalation, it seems they were divided along the usual lines regarding issues
such as accountability, international humanitarian law and humanitarian access.

Source: Chronology of Events in Myanmar. Accessed and verified on November 11, 2020.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/myanmar.php

V.

Post-Genocide Crisis Management

2017
In reaction to the genocide, the international regime was systematic in expressing grave
concern and condemning the violence against the Rohingyas, but also was unsystematic and had
mixed responses about what should be done, especially with Myanmar, at the national, the UN
and UNSC, and the regional levels.
National. Nationally, Myanmar denied the allegations of human rights violations. They
claimed that its security forces did not target civilians and were responding to attacks by
Rohingya militants in August. However, the government also blocked independent access to the
region, including by the United Nations, and impeded delivery of humanitarian aid.200 Since the

Reuters, “Myanmar Military Exonerates Itself in Report on Atrocities against Rohingya,” The Guardian,
November 13, 2017, accessed and verified on November 29, 2020,
200
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genocide, many states’ leaders have visited Rohingya refugee camps in Cox's Bazaar,
Bangladesh, and offered help in the forms of relief supplies and monetary aid for Rohingya
refugees. While the majority was vague about what should be done, or urged the UN to address
it, or pressured Aung San Suu Kyi to condemn the atrocities and address human-rights issues,
some countries wanted Myanmar to take responsibility and keep them accountable. On the other
side, several key countries, such as China, India, and the Philippines, supported the efforts of
Myanmar in safeguarding the stability of its national development.
Regional. On the regional level, while regional organizations condemned the human
rights violations against the Rohingya, there were mixed responses regarding what should be
done. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation stepped up and proposed a resolution in the
UNGA, urging Myanmar to end a military campaign against Muslim Rohingya and called for the
appointment of a UN special envoy, which China, Russia and some regional countries
opposed.201 Meanwhile, the EU, as other regional organizations soon followed, pushed for
general agreement and arrangements being reached between the Governments of Bangladesh and
Myanmar, to create a sustainable return of the Rohingya and their reintegration into Myanmar
society as equal members.202
UN. The GA resolution mentioned earlier was adopted by a vote of 122 to 10 with 24
abstentions. It called on the Myanmar government to allow access for aid workers, ensure the
return of all refugees and grant full citizenship rights to the Rohingya.203 In addition, it requested
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that UN Secretary General António Guterres appoint a new special envoy to Myanmar.
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, UNGA resolutions are non-binding, so Myanmar was not
compelled to comply.
On the UNSC level, as illustrated in Figure 14, from September, when the acts of
genocide were still actively taking place (until September 24, 2017), through December, the
Council members mostly met and discussed the recommendations for improving the situation in
the state with regard to conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, reconciliation,
institution-building and development. Superpowers themselves had mixed opinions on what
should be done. The United States wanted to keep Myanmar accountable for their crimes against
humanity and genocide through the imposition of sanctions, while the United Kingdom and
France were moderately passive. Meanwhile, Russia and China opposed the U.S. idea. No
official decisions and actions could have been taken by the UNSC, given this stalemate. As a
response to blockage or excessively slow procedures at the UNSC, the U.S. pursued action
against Myanmar on its national level. On December 21, 2017, under the Magnitsky Global Act,
the U.S. levied sanctions against Myanmar general Maung Maung Soe for violence against
Rohingya Muslims. The U.S. said Maung Maung Soe was responsible for “widespread human
rights abuse,” citing credible evidence of mass killings, rapes and villages being burned.204
2018
By 2018, the international regime was a bit more systematic in recognizing the existence
of a genocide against the Rohingya and the severity of the issue, as a study was published
estimating that more than 24,000 Rohingya people were killed by the Myanmar military and the
204
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local Buddhists since the beginning of the genocide on 25 August 2017.205 The study also
estimated that over 18,000 Rohingya Muslim women and girls were raped, around 116,000
Rohingya were beaten, and around 36,000 Rohingya were thrown into fire.206 Mass graves have
also been discovered in several parts of Rakhine State.207 In March and April 2018, a
Washington-based human rights pro bono law firm, the Public International Law & Policy
Group, conducted an investigation into the 2017 assault on the Rohingya with a grant from the
US Department of State.208 After investigating and conducting 1,024 interviews with Rohingya
refugees, it found reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity, genocide, and war
crimes were committed against the Rohingya, with its 15,000 pages of documentation of
“atrocity crimes” within its companion report.209
National. Still, Myanmar continued to deny the allegations of persecution against the
Rohingya and said its military campaign across northern Rakhine State was a response to attacks
by Rohingya rebels. Authorities in Bangladesh and Myanmar have held discussions aimed at
repatriation of Rohingya refugees, but the efforts have so far foundered.
Regional. In the 2018 United Kingdom’s Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting, heads called for a halt to all violence, a restoration of normality, and accountability of
the perpetrators of gross violations of human rights through an independent process of
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investigation.210 They further called for the sustainable return of all such displaced Rohingya
sheltered in Bangladesh to their rightful homes in Myanmar under UNHCR oversight and they
called for the creation of the necessary conditions for sustainable return in safety, security and
dignity. The UK’s Commonwealth Heads also called for action to address the root causes of the
current crisis, including through the immediate implementation of the Rakhine Advisory (Kofi
Annan) Commission recommendations. The UK’s Commonwealth Heads also noted the general
agreement and arrangements reached between the Governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar as
a beginning towards the sustainable return of the Rohingya and their reintegration into Myanmar
society as equal members. In the 2018 summit, according to Human Rights Watch, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) addressed the Rohingya crisis but focused
largely on repatriation issues, treating the “humanitarian situation” in Myanmar’s Rakhine State
merely as “a matter of concern” and disregarding the government’s crimes against humanity.211
UN. In 2018, the UN has been communicating and working with Myanmar to create
repatriation of Rohingya to Myanmar.212 On the UNSC level, as illustrated in Figure 14, from
February to August, the council held three meetings on the situation in Myanmar and the
Rohingya refugee crisis, but none of them resulted in action by the UNSC.
2019
By March 2019, over 909,000 Rohingya refugees were in Uhkya and Teknaf Upazilas
camps in Bangladesh. On April 4, 2019, overwhelmed by the huge Rohingya population living
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on its territory, Bangladesh announced that it could not continue to host the Rohingyas
indefinitely, and called for creation of a sustainable return of the Rohingya and their
reintegration into Myanmar society as equal members.213 In late 2019, the countries agreed to
repatriate several thousand refugees, but none in the designated group was willing to return to
Myanmar. Leaders of the Rohingya community said they will not return until their citizenship
rights are guaranteed. Meanwhile, the United Nations has criticized the repatriation plans, saying
that conditions in Myanmar are still unsafe for Rohingya. The United Nations, Human Rights
Watch, and numerous other humanitarian and human rights groups have concluded that
conditions [as of 2019] in Rakhine State are not conducive for voluntary, safe, or dignified
repatriation of Rohingya. Human Rights Watch estimated that “500,000 Rohingya remaining in
Myanmar are trapped in appalling conditions, confined to camps and villages without freedom of
movement, subject to ongoing state persecution and violence, and cut off from many basic
humanitarian services including adequate food, medical care, and education.”214
National. As of September 2019, according to the UN, Myanmar was willing to
repatriate “verified returnees” from Bangladesh.215 Kyaw Tint Swe, Myanmar’s Union Minister
for the Office of the State Counsellor, claimed that people who had been living in Rakhine state
“have a different legal status.”216 According to their exclusive standards, those who qualify for
citizenship will be issued citizenship cards. The rest will receive National Verification Cards
which he likened to the “green card” issued to immigrants in the United States. According to
Mr.Swe, some 300 people have already returned to Myanmar of their own volition “despite
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obstacles, including killings and threats by ARSA.”217 The UN demands for “safe zones” were
dismissed. Mr. Swe called on Bangladesh to faithfully implement the bilateral agreement they
made on November 23, 2017.218 As for accountability for the events in Rakhine state, Mr. Swe
reported that a military investigation is currently underway.
Regionally, there were no notable advancements in 2019.
UN. On November 11, 2019, the Republic of the Gambia instituted proceedings against
the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and claimed
Myanmar had violated the provisions of the Genocide Convention. Gambia wants the
International Court of Justice to order Myanmar to “cease any acts that violate the Convention”
and “implement its obligation to prevent genocide;” “hold individuals who committed acts in
violation of the Genocide Convention criminally accountable within its domestic legal system;”
“pay reparations to the victims of the Rohingya, including allowing them to return to Myanmar,
reinstating their citizenship, and undertaking protection of the group’s human rights;” and
“demonstrate its intent to not commit further violations of the Genocide Convention.”219
Furthermore, Gambia asked the Court to indicate provisional measures.220 In December 2019,
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Aung San Suu Kyi, in the name of the Myanmar government, rejected allegations of genocide at
the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ).
2020 — Recent Developments Involving the World Court
On January 23, 2020, the ICJ first determined that it had “prima facie jurisdiction.”
According to American Society for International Law (ASIL), it was to “justify issuing an order
for provisional measures.”221 In other words, on a basic level, the Gambia’s case and argument in
the initial phase was sufficient for the court to argue that it has the authority to preside over the
dispute. In response to the Gambia’s 2019 provisional measures request, in 2020 the Court issued
a preliminary ruling, which ordered Burma to prevent future acts of genocide. Still, according to
ASIL, even after the Court’s ruling, military strikes against Rohingya populations continued.222
As for the next step, both sides need to submit their legal briefs addressing the issues on
the merits that are in dispute. Similar to other international cases, the Court will require several
years to adjudicate these requests. As of November 2020, there were no new updates.
VI.

Rohingya Muslim Crises & The 2017 Genocide
As seen in the illustrated cases in 1991, 2012, 2016, and the 2017 genocide, these are

cases of Myanmar’s violation against the human rights of stateless people who were not helped
by the international institutions that were supposed to help them. Arguably, if any of these
international institutions or states cared and took action more diligently, as early as 1991 or 2012
and/or even in 2016, then potentially the atrocities that befell on the Rohingyas, and even the
2017 genocide itself, could have been prevented. In analyzing the Rohingya Muslim Crises and
genocide and why the international regime couldn’t protect the Rohingyas, several systemic
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Design Flaws, which were illustrated in chapter 4, were critically at play; namely, Change,
Hierarchy of World Power and Competition, and lastly, Jurisdiction.
While tracing and diagnosing the origin and the possible causes behind the Myanmar’s
crises and the genocide against the Rohingya, I identified two moments— 1962 and 2015— as
critical junctures marked by changes in the political regime, and the beginning of the military’s
anti-minority form of nationalism, and exclusion policies. Following the definition of critical
juncture— according to Giovanni Capoccia — 1962 and 2015 are the key points which caused
and led Myanmar down the path of interethnic conflict and genocide, rather than other possible
paths of inclusion and peace.223
Slow Adaptation to Change. O
 ne of the critical reasons why the UN could not intervene
and prevent the military coup in 1962 or end the junta's continued reign in 2015 was because the
UN’s framework did not account for volatility of the state's form of government, behavior, and
policies over time and lacked measures to address it when it happens.
1962. This was the first critical juncture, where following the coup, Burma’s form of
government changed from democratic regime to military regime. With no opposition both
domestically and internationally, the junta’s rule continued. Its anti-minority form of nationalism
and exclusion policy practices effectively began when it changed the nation’s constitution and
passed the Emergency Immigration Act in 1974, which allowed authorities to confiscate
Rohingyas’ national registration cards (citizenship). Shortly after, it made a new law which
based citizenship on ethnicity and excluded Rohingya and other minority communities in 1982;
started denying Rohingya children birth certificates in 1994; issued Rohingyas with a new form
of identification, known as a temporary registration card or “white card,” which did not serve as
Karl-Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam D. Sheingate, The Oxford Handbook of Historical
Institutionalism, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2018,
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662814.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199662814.
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proof of citizenship in 1995; and lastly, invalidated Rohingya white cards, their only form of
identification and required them to obtain national verification cards, which incorrectly identified
them as immigrants from Bangladesh in 2015. By 1982, it successfully engineered a series of
exclusion policies, which rendered Rohingyas and other minorities stateless. As illustrated
earlier, it successfully ostracized and supported various violent campaigns and persecutions
against the Rohingyas in 1991 and 2012, without facing any repercussion or justice either
domestically or internationally. It was from the 1990s to the early 2000s, where the military
realized that they needed to get onboard with the democratization train. Through the UN, it
realized that it was carefully being observed by the UNSC and the only way to maintain power
was to share it.
2015. As a second critical juncture in Myanmar, 2015 was supposed to be different. This
was the critical juncture moment where the regime which previously seemed invulnerable and
not responsive to outside pressure gave in, and where the creation of a new path could have been
possible, preventing the following crises and the 2017 genocide. For instance, as a result of the
UN and UNSC’s active pressuring the military government regarding democracy, in November,
Myanmar held a national election. The military tried to brand and align itself with human rights
and went along with the election because it wanted to avoid sanctions and get the elections
approved. In effect, following the election, its form of government transitioned from direct
military rule to civilian rule under a government formed by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National
League for Democracy (NLD). However, as illustrated in 2016 and genocide in 2017, it was not
a full democratization, as the military still maintained a lot of power. For instance, when the
ARSA staged an attack on the police, simply changing the political regime was not enough for
Myanmar to change its behavior. As they have done in 1991 and 2012, the military have
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retaliated with widespread campaign of violence of killing people, raping women, and destroying
Rohingya villages throughout northern Rakhine indiscriminately, which included innocent
civilians, women, and children. The reasons why this moment did not ultimately turn into a
critical juncture was because Myanmar's constitution, which the military wrote to legitimize
itself back in 1974, still gave the military so much power by design, and since Suu Kyi was
unable to control and change Myanmar’s dependent path. To maintain the power sharing
agreement, she had to make a lot of compromises and ended up co-opted by the military.
Hierarchy of World Power and Competition. S
 everal critical reasons why the UN could
not intervene and prevent the military coup and the junta's reign in 1962 and 2015, the
humanitarian crises in 1991, 2012, and 2016, and the 2017 genocide can be explained with the
‘Hierarchy of World Power and Competition’ design flaws: Selective Interest of the UNSC. As
discussed in Chapter 3, 1962 critical juncture was in the middle of the Cold War era, where both
the UN and the UNSC’s functions were limited by the competition that took place in between the
United States and USSR (Russia).
Selective Interest. I n the post-Cold War era, in the case of Rohingya, although the UN has
been eyeing Myanmar’s military government and the human rights situation as early as 1991, it
did not make it to the UNSC’s agenda until 2005. Only after the U.S. raised concerns about
Myanmar at the Council’s closed consultations in June, the UNSC showed interest in the
situation in Myanmar and met more than three times annually from December 2005. From 2005,
as illustrated in Figure 12, the members of the UNSC seemed to be interested in encouraging
progress towards an inclusive and democratic political process in Myanmar more than the human
rights crisis and refugee problem. This was especially evident, when the topic of applying
“responsibility to protect” in Myanmar came up for the first and the last time in 2008, after
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Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar. On May 7, 2008, France asked the Council to consider using
“responsibility to protect” as the basis for Council action to get aid into Myanmar. According to
the Security Council Report, this proposal was met with considerable resistance. Although the
opposing forces or states to UNSC considering the R2P in Myanmar was not specifically stated,
the fact that there were opposing states exemplify why the UNSC ultimately did not employ the
R2P in the case of Rohingya and Myanmar. Even after the 2012 and the 2016 crises and the 2017
genocide, the UNSC resorted to only meeting to check on the situation, instead of even
considering the R2P to protect the Rohingyas. Post 2017 Genocide, both the UN and especially
the UNSC have neither employed any enforcement measures to keep the Rohingyas safe nor
keep the Myanmar government accountable.224
Jurisdiction. T
 he last reason why the UN could not intervene and prevent the military
coup in 1962 and the junta's continued power in 2015, and the humanitarian crises in 1991, 2012,
and 2016, and the 2017 genocide can be explained with the ‘Jurisdiction’ design flaw. As
discussed in Chapter 3, to this day, States have the authority over not only their territory and
people, but also powers they delegate to international institutions; and to decide either to accept
and comply or simply to not comply with international law and norms.
Since the Junta took over in 1962, one of the ways it has successfully and legally avoided
the UN’s intervention in all of its humanitarian crises in 1991, 2012, and 2016, and even the
2017 genocide has to do with international treaties. As discussed in Chapter 3. since Myanmar
did not participate in nor comply with the majority of the UN’s International Human Rights
Treaties, the UN did not have the legal jurisdiction to intervene in Myanmar’s state affairs.

The 2019 case of The Gambia v. Myanmar is an exception, as it was a legal action brought by one state against
another, in a UN court, but without action by the UNSC.
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Although the UNSC’s power to apply R2P to intervene was an exception to that rule—as the
UNSC had a lack of interest nor agreement in doing so — Myanmar’s success in avoiding facing
any repercussions and the UN’s failure to protect the Rohingya’s human rights and prevent the
2017 Genocide, alludes to how important the UN’s Design Flaw of lack of jurisdiction problem
is.
VII.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we discussed how even before the 2017 genocide took place, on
numerous occasions such as 1991, 2012, and 2016, the UN and the UNSC were not only aware,
but also had the opportunity to do something to protect the Rohingya and yet did not take any
action. The 2017 genocide against the Rohingya Muslims was not just a politically driven state
led violence against the stateless minority, but an allusion to how incompetent our current
international human rights regime is in the face of state sovereignty, and furthermore, how
systemic design flaws limit the UN’s ability to protect all people.
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION
I.

Introduction
This thesis focused on evaluating the UN’s legal regime’s systemic design and

capabilities in protecting human rights. Without a doubt, since 1945, with the creation of the UN,
the world became more interdependent, and the creation of many international human rights laws
and norms were possible. However, after observing the UN’s past institutional evolution from
1945 to present, major systemic changes or critical junctures, and h uman rights instruments and
documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and similar conventions that call for
protection of human rights, on the contrary to the UN’s claim, in practice, human rights are not
“universal, inalienable, indivisible, interdependent, equal, and non-discriminatory rights and
obligations.”225 In fact, historically, it has never been the case. Furthermore, this thesis contends
that the current international human rights regime is simply not enough to protect the most
vulnerable people and their human rights, especially when there is a change at the level of the
state and the regime adapts too slowly to change. I identified the three other systemic design
flaws that also limit the UN’s ability to protect all people in Chapter 4 as Jurisdiction; Hierarchy
of World Power; and lastly, Competition.
Originally, this thesis asked two central questions ‘why couldn’t the UN protect the
Rohingya’s human rights?’ and ‘who upholds your human rights when you are stateless?’ and I
have argued it varies theoretically versus in practice. Theoretically, as the international human
rights regime is a complex collective system involving the states, the regional system, and the
international system, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, your human rights– especially when you
are stateless– will mainly vary depending on the state and the region you reside in. As for why
225
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the UN could not protect the Rohingya’s human rights, I argued that the issue was not because
the UN lacked any measures or instruments to do so, but rather, the UN could not make those
measures and instruments effective in practice. In Chapter 5, I have argued that the UN’s ability
to protect Rohingyas was limited more critically because of the four systemic design flaws I
identified: Jurisdiction; Hierarchy of World Power; Competition; a nd Slow Adaptation to
Change.
The jurisdiction design flaw explains why the UN’s limited jurisdiction in state’s affairs
and how they treat their citizens is an issue, when dealing with humanitarian crises, and crimes
against humanity, especially genocide. As discussed in Chapter 5 and the case study, although
the UN was aware of the ongoing humanitarian crisis that was happening in Myanmar at
multiple points of time and as early as 1991, all they did was deplore the use of violence without
any effective pressure or measure, and focused instead on restoring electoral democracy, instead
of tackling the humanitarian crisis issue. As this crisis continued before the genocide took place
in 2017, the level of violence that was used against the Rohingya in 2012 and 2016 should have
been enough for the UN to step in. In Chapter 5, I made the argument that if the UN stepped in
as early as 1962 or even by 2015, Myanmar could have taken a different path, and this series of
violence leading up to the 2017 genocide could have been avoided. However, due to the UN’s
limited jurisdiction and other design flaws, this crisis and genocide against the Rohingyas were
possible.
The Hierarchy of World Power d esign flaw describes the uneven membership and
structure that is based on the hierarchy of power or importance among states. Commonly, many
look at the UN as an IGO that is based on equal membership, where all states are considered and
valued equally. Although this may be partly true in the UNGA, it is not true in other major
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organs of the UN, such as the UNSC, which has more direct power to influence and say in global
matters. Especially in the UNSC, the P-5 members not only have permanent membership, but
also hold a veto power, which could override the UNSC and the UN’s decision and action
altogether. As discussed in Chapter 4, although the usage of the veto by the P-5 superpower
members varies and has varied at different critical junctures in the international system, each
veto affected the UNSC’s power dynamic and ability to protect human rights throughout
multiple international humanitarian crises. In the case of the Rohingya crisis, the power of veto
was never used only because the UNSC never passed the briefing and discussion phase for any
proposed intervention in particular. However, one can argue as well that the inherent and
unstated threat of the veto by Russia and China — which objected to all forms of intervention in
domestic affairs — that kept intervention off the table in the UNSC, despite the US’s interest (as
seen in the use of unilateral sanctions).
The Competition design flaw describes how the designers of the UN did not account for
states’ erratic behaviors driven by its selective (national) interest and competition. Furthermore,
they did not account for the possibility of how these states can shape and reshape the UN to
better serve their own interests. This design flaw was also apparent in the UNSC’s power
dynamic and management of the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. The UNSC was aware of the
existence of a humanitarian crisis as early as 2005, when the US raised concerns about Myanmar
at the Council’s closed consultations. While holding annual meetings in Myanmar, in 2008, for
the first and the last time, the possibility of using “responsibility to protect” as the basis for
Council action to get aid into Myanmar was proposed by France. In retrospect, using the R2P in
2008 would have been appropriate and critical in preventing the later humanitarian crises in 2012
and 2016 and the genocide from taking place in Myanmar. However, this was met with
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considerable resistance within the Council. Although the information about which countries were
in the resistance force was not made public, some scholars, such as Nishikawa, argued that the
UNSC most likely did not intervene because members of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) wanted to avoid addressing it collectively. This was because the principle of
non-intervention has been maintained in intra-regional relations within Southeast Asia, and since
they all had cases of human rights violations, internal conflicts or long-sustained violence
themselves.226 Following Nishikawa’s analysis and reasoning, the selective interest element of
competition design flaw was definitely present in the UNSC’s decision making process and it
explains why the UNSC ultimately did nothing.
The Slow Adaptation to Change design flaw points out how the UN cannot effectively
enforce its human rights protection measures when there are changes within the state, especially
when states breakdown and/or new states are found; or when a state’s form of government
changes; or when a state creates a new inclusion or exclusion policy. As discussed in Chapter 5,
in Myanmar’s case, there were two critical junctures where there were regime changes and
exclusion policies– in 1962 and 2015. In between both critical junctures, the Rohingyas were
rendered stateless and there were numerous cases of human rights violations and suppressions,
especially in 1974, 1978, 1982, 1989, 1991, 2012, 2015, and 2017. Each of these cases should
have been opportunities and indicators for the UN to step in, but instead they became the amount
of times the UN failed to do so. The UN’s failure to act and to protect the Rohingyas in all these
years is an example and result of a ‘slow adaptation to change’ design flaw.
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II.

Recommendation

Ongoing Trend & Issues
Since WWII, we are living in an age of rising nationalism and sovereignty. To illustrate
some big examples, China and Russia have been pushing against the UN since the 2000s; the
Trump administration's foreign policy against the UN and NATO from 2016 to 2020; the United
Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, also known as, Brexit in 2020; and currently,
Hungary and Poland pushing against the European Union (2020). In response to the flows of
refugees from Syria and Libya into Western Europe, and the flows of migrants from Central
America through Mexico into the US, there has been a rise of anti-immigrant politics.
As a result, despite many human rights mechanisms and efforts made, the number of
asylum seekers, refugees, and the stateless people has only been increasing rapidly over time. As
of 2019, according to the UN, there are more than 79.5 million people who are refugees, asylum
seekers, stateless, and internally displaced people.227 With no new effective measure, this refugee
crisis and human rights issues are bound to worsen dramatically as some parts of the world
become more uninhabitable due to climate change, as well as of other common causes, such as
persecution, war, and economic crises. As shown in the Rohingyas case, not having citizenship,
any form of identification, or travel documents makes even immigrating or seeking to become a
refugee in other states more difficult.
As of 2020, the international human rights regime does not have any effective measures
to solve these problems in place. The individual states are not reliable enough to protect them.
Although R2P was a good initiative, as shown in the Rohingya’s case, it is neither reliable nor a
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long term solution. Like R2P, addressing these problems should be an international collective
responsibility.
Solution/Recommendation
My original international policy project idea is called ‘Global Citizenship’ (“Global
Citizenship” or “Project”). Global Citizenship is an ambitious and radical two-part policy project
idea, which aims to encourage states to uphold their human rights obligations; address the
growing problems of statelessness, and refugee crises; and lastly, restore human rights across the
world (“Goals”). After observing the existence of a wide disparity of human rights across the
world and tragic humanitarian crises, and examining the current international human rights
regime and its critical Design Flaws, many of the key principles and ideas of the Project were
found. This Project firmly believes the Goals can be achieved by establishing the following, (1) a
new Global Citizenship status; (2) a special international human rights jurisdiction; (3) neutral
zones or society; and lastly, (4) a rescue team. In consideration of the sheer magnitude of what
this Project seeks to accomplish and the immeasurable amounts of preparations and time, I
recommend for this Project to be achieved in two parts and employ different strategies. I will
describe the design and strategies for both two parts and how it could potentially play out.228
Part I
The first part is a short term plan, which employs soft law229 ( “First Part”). The primary
purpose of this First Part is to introduce the concept of creating a new Global Citizenship status
and to gradually gain the support of the UN’s member states and to discover supporter states for
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop this idea in full, but the thesis is trying to design the broad
outlines that can be developed further.
229
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the second part. The key to accomplish the First Part will depend on and require the support and
partnerships with other human rights NGOs, IGOS, and nonprofits. Ideally, with enough support
and supportive key states, bringing this up as a resolution on the UNGA’s floor will be the next
step. While knowing that it is a non-binding measure, I chose to start with soft law because it can
accomplish developing common norms more efficiently in the short term, which the hard law
cannot. Then, only after it makes it to the UNGA’s floor for review and passes, it officially
becomes a soft law. Once it becomes a soft law, the next step is to again partner with other
NGOs and key states to encourage other states to either join the initiative and/or to uphold their
human rights obligations. With this, the First Part is accomplished.
Part II
The second part is the long term plan, which will take form in more of either a
convention and/or a treaty (“Second Part”). The primary purpose of this Second Part is to arrange
and establish (1) a new Global Citizenship status; (2) a special international human rights
jurisdiction; (3) neutral zones or society; and lastly, (4) a rescue team. Given the nature of how a
convention and a treaty works, although the states will not be obligated to sign on, they will be
heavily encouraged to partake in this new initiative to expand the Global Citizen Project given
how soft law works.
By the time this project reaches the Second Part, after successively completing the First
Part, the Project is expected to have a considerable number of supporters ranging from IGOs,
NGOs, nonprofits, and even states. Any partnering states who sign onto this project will be
referred to as ‘Partner States.’ Partner States will be asked to help, organize, plan, and support
this initiative from the take off to until all the goals are met and the neutral zones or societies can
self-sustain with their minor involvement. The soft law will help facilitate the dynamic whereby
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the "Partner" status will be also viewed with prestige and influence among the states. Moving
forward, this will make it easier to convince other states to sign on in order to share in those
benefits and not be left out.
Global Citizenship Status. The first main goal is to establish a global citizenship, or a
special UN protected global citizen status. This new Global Citizenship status will initially
mainly serve to create an international valid identification document for everyone, including
stateless people. Although it was mainly designed to help people who do not necessarily have
citizenship, such as stateless people, and for people who lost all their relevant identification
documents as a result of fleeing war, persecution, and/or any form of crisis, it will be offered to
anyone. Once a person becomes a global citizen, they will be given access to identification
materials, such as an official ID card, and even passports. As a result, this will clear out one of
the biggest roadblocks that the stateless, refugee, and/or asylum seekers face when they are being
processed in other countries—not having an identity document.
Special International Human Rights Jurisdiction. In reflection of the jurisdiction design
flaw and to make protecting everyone’s human rights, especially the most vulnerable stateless
people, easier, I want to make a new special international jurisdiction which will allow the UN
and/or Partner States to claim and to protect its registered people’s human rights. To give an
example of how I envision this to play out is, when a Global Citizen is experiencing a violation
of their human rights, wherever they may be, the UN or the Partner States will not only have the
jurisdiction to claim and rescue them, but also to represent them in the World Court (ICJ) and
hold the state responsible for the violation accountable.
Neutral Zones or Society. The third goal of Project Global Citizenship is to establish a
neutral zone(s) or a society. The backbone idea behind establishing a neutral zone(s) is to create
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a politically neutral safe haven where Global Citizens can seek refuge and to rebuild their life.
The partnerships with NGOs, such as Doctors Without Borders, and volunteers from around the
world will be critical in providing both necessary and rehabilitative services, such as access to
medical treatment, education, housing, job training, etc. The law and order would be democratic
and resemble the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as an effective European
human rights system. After settling and rebuilding themselves, the Global Citizens will have the
option to either emigrate into other host countries and/or to remain and help build a neutral
society. Ideally, the neutral zones will develop into a self-efficient and sustainable neutral
society.
Rescue Team. The fourth and the last goal of project Global Citizenship is to assemble a
rescue team. As mentioned earlier, there are more than 79.5 million people who are refugees,
asylum seekers, stateless, and internally displaced people. Among these 79.5 million people,
there are many similar communities like Rohingyas, stateless or not, experiencing human rights
violations, and unable to escape such fate. With project Global Citizenship, I want to create a
specialist rescue team which will advocate and work to help rescue these people. To give an
example of how I envision this to be implemented is to have these people denounce their current
unwanted citizenship and to claim their Global Citizenship, which in turn would allow for the
special jurisdiction to become legally activated. This would allow for the UN and/or the Partner
States to fund and deploy a rescue team to aid them.
III.

Conclusion
My research and evaluation of the current international human rights regime indicates

that with its current design, it is simply not enough to protect all people, especially the most
vulnerable stateless people. From the Rohingya case in particular, I learned that although the UN
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has the tools but because of its design flaws it is unable to help these people. I started hearing
about the Rohingya crisis while I was still in high school. Personally, ‘identity’ is and has always
been important to me and my identity as a scholar, but also this project sheds light on an issue
and example of how an identity can be politicized. It is emotional on some level and connects the
broader issue of human rights to a sense of people being persecuted for being who they are, and I
felt a personal connection as a former undocumented immigrant.
Although Project Global Citizenship in many ways can be viewed as impractical based
on the amount of financial resources and international partnerships it requires, as American
baseball manager Tommy Lasorda, once said “the difference between the impossible and the
possible lies in a man's determination.”230 It is my goal that someday, we will live in a world
where Global Citizenship project and its goals are finished; a world where everyone has some
place to call home; a world where human rights are respected and protected universally
regardless of one’s identity; a world with no more genocide and ethnic cleansings; and lastly, a
world where identity is not politicized.

230

https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/tommy_lasorda_126566
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APPENDIX
Chronology of Major Events from Post WWII to Present
I conducted a chronological analysis in an effort to better understand the UN's
institutional formation and change from 1945 to present. This also includes but is not limited to
human rights regime’s growth, genocides, wars, events related to stateless people, treaties,
diplomatic relations, and many more. For the full list of variables that were identified in the
chronology, see below.
Although this chronology was not directly used as charts or figures within the text, I was
able to gain many insights and trends, which helped identifying and formulating the four design
flaws. Access to the chronology can be made by clicking or copying the link below.

KEY TO CODING OF THE CHRONOLOGY
Red: Genocide, ethnic cleansing, attack on the minority/stateless people
Orange: War/Acts of Aggression
Yellow: Important events/Stateless people/displaced people
Green: Establishment, events, and/or changes in evolution of International regime
Blue: Treaties, and diplomatic relations
Purple:Change in State’s Independence/Annexation/Incorporation/Colonization/Invasion
Pink: Political System change to Military Dictatorship, Communism, Monarchy, Facism

Link:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FYLS7M4aQ8H-evWpVy-Na4698B5KY
OcjcEbtHg42pIQ/edit?usp=sharing
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